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PART II

VOLUME II

BILINGUALISM IN SOUTH AFRICA

Report prepared for the Royal Commission
on Bilingualism and Biculturalism

K.A. Heard

July 1966.

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THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM, PARTIES AND VOTING IN SOUTH AFRICA

By

K. A. Heard

June 1966

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A. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM

1. The Composition of The House of Assemblya) Size(i) "Ordinary" Members

The number of members of The House of Assembly was originally fixed at 121. It was, however, further provided by the original section 34 that starting in 1911 a census of the European population of the Union was to be taken every five years and that for every increase corresponding to the "quota" - i.e. the total adult white males divided by the existing number of seats - the total number of members should be increased by one. In other words every five years there should be an upward revision in the total membership in the House more or less proportionate to the increase in the adult white male population. On this basis, the size of the House increased from the original 121 members to 150 which total was made terminal until the Constitution Amendment Act was passed in 1965. The following table shows the rate of increase. The dates are for the years in which the census was taken.

1904	1911	1918 ^{1.}	1921	1926	1931
121	130	134	135	148	150

1. The taking of the census was postponed from 1916 to 1918 on account of the war.

The original system providing for the pro rata expansion in the size of The House of Assembly should have maintained the number of voters per constituency at a reasonably stable level. The admission of White women to the franchise in 1931, the fixing of the number of seats at 150, and the subsequent removal first of Africans then of Coloureds from the common roll have all been factors influencing the size of constituencies whether positively or negatively. On the whole, especially since 1942, the increases in the population have resulted in constituencies of constantly increasing size in terms of voters. This tendency has meant, too, that with the rural White population remaining relatively stable, rural constituencies have also grown considerably in area, thus creating problems of communication.

This last factor was one of the principal reasons for the passing of the Constitution Amendment Act, No. 83 of 1965. This Act provided that the total number of seats be increased to 160, but it did not provide, as some had suggested, for an automatic increase beyond that number along the lines of the original provision of the Act of Union.

(ii) Natives' Representatives

Those qualifying under the provisions of the Cape franchise existing immediately prior to Union remained on the common roll for the election of members of the House of

Assembly, regardless of their colour. These voting rights, principally affecting Africans and Coloureds, were protected by the voting procedures contained in the "entrenched" clauses - i.e. sections 35 and 152- of the Act of Union, which required that they could be amended only with the concurrence of two-thirds of the total membership of both Houses of Parliament sitting in joint session. The Representation of Natives Act, 1936, was passed in accordance with these provisions, and, in accordance with its terms, the Native voters of the Cape were removed from the common roll and were granted instead the right to elect three representatives in separately designated constituencies. Accordingly the total membership of the House was increased to 153. These Natives' Representatives, however, were subsequently abolished by the passing of the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959; so that from 1960, when the Act came into effect, the total membership was reduced by three.

(iii) South West Africa

Although South West Africa is not juridically a part of the territories of South Africa, being a mandated territory under the Covenant of the League of Nations, it is administered as though it were part of the Republic's territories. Nevertheless, until 1950 its inhabitants remained unrepresented in the South African Parliament, which largely controlled its

destinies. This situation was, however, rectified by the passing of the South West African Affairs Amendment Act,¹ 1949, which provided that the voters of South West Africa should have the right to elect six members to the House of Assembly. This number falls short of that of any of the provinces, but, in terms of number of voters per constituency, still confers, as we shall see, a disproportional representation on the Territory.

The result of the South West African Affairs Amendment Act was pro tempore to raise the number of the members of the House to 159.

(iv) Coloured Representation

The Coloured voters were originally protected by the same sections of the 'constitution as were the African voters. In 1951, however, the Government introduced a Bill into Parliament with the object of removing them from the common roll and providing them instead with a separate system of representation. This led to a prolonged constitutional struggle that was resolved only in 1956 with the passing of the South Africa Act Amendment Act and the revalidation of the Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951. In

1. Only Whites are voters in S.W.A. which enjoys the same general franchise as that existing in South Africa.

accordance with this Act, the Coloured voters of the Cape were removed from the common roll and were divided into separate constituencies for the election of four members of the House of Assembly.

(v) Summary

These legislative changes have produced effects on the total memberships of the House of Assembly that can be best summarized by means of the following table:

	1936	1950	1956	1960	1966
Ordinary Seats	150	150	150	150	160
Natives' Representatives	3	3	3		
S.W.A.		6	6	6	6
Coloureds			4	4	4
Total	153	159	163	160	170

b) Delimitation of Constituencies

Until the passing of the Constitution Amendment Act, 1965, the process of delimiting constituencies was carried forward in two stages. The first stage determined the number of constituencies per province, and the second determined the constituency boundaries within each province. The first stage was purely arithmetical although political factors, as we shall see, determined the data and thus affected the

results. The Electoral Consolidation Act, 1942, required the Delimitation Commission to apportion the number of seats to the provinces in accordance with their adult White population.¹ In other words, a Union quota was arrived at by dividing the total adult White population in the province by the total adult White population of the Union and multiplying by 150 - the number of seats to be filled. The important feature of this procedure was that it left out of account the non-white voters. In consequence, for the period when there were African and Coloured voters on the common roll in the Cape, the Cape was under-represented vis-à-vis the other provinces. The Electoral Laws Amendment Act, 1952, perpetuated this relative under-representation, for while it tied the distribution of seats among the provinces to voters rather than population, it still restricted it to White voters. It was only after the removal of the Coloured voters in the Cape from the common roll that it enjoyed equality of representation in terms of registered voters. This is illustrated by the following table showing the provincial quota (this term is explained on next page) for each of the four provinces from 1943-1958.

1. Prior to the enfranchisement of White women in 1931 it was in proportion to the adult White male population.

	<u>1943</u>	<u>1948</u>	<u>1953</u>	<u>1958</u>
Cape	8,905	9,508	11,132	9,949
Natal	7,515	8,402	10,477	10,026
Transvaal	7,956	8,769	10,193	10,009
O.F.S.	7,846	8,909	10,509	9,754

The provincial quota was used for the second stage in delimitation. It was arrived at by dividing the total number of voters (i.e. regardless of race or colour) in each province by the number of seats allocated to it as a result of the first stage outlined above. The provincial quota, then, represents the ideal number of voters per constituency in each province. In practice, of course, this is impossible, and, indeed, may represent the "ideal" only on grounds of arithmetical equality. The Commissioners were required to make the constituencies in each Province "as nearly as maybe, equal to the quota of the Province", but other considerations were required to be taken into account. These were:

- (a) community or diversity of interest,
- (b) means of communication,
- (c) physical features,
- (d) boundaries of existing constituencies
- (e) sparsity or density of population.

In giving effect to these considerations, the Commissioners were permitted to "load" and "unload" constituencies up to a maximum of 15% of the quota. The invariable effect of these provisions has been to load urban constituencies and to

unload rural constituencies. This, theoretically, allows a maximum discrepancy within a given province of 30% of the quota between the largest and the smallest constituency. In practice, the discrepancy has often been very much larger on account of changes in voting population during the interval between delimitation and voting. Since the passing of the Electoral Laws Amendment Act, 1952, which provided that delimitations should take place at intervals of not less than five and not more than ten years instead of the previous five-yearly periods, the possibility of much greater variations in constituency size within each province, let alone across the country, has been greatly increased. In the 1961 general election, based on the 1958 delimitation, the largest constituency in the Transvaal, for example, was 78% larger than the smallest constituency in the same province.

The Constitution Amendment Act, 1965, made important changes in these procedures. In the first place it did away with the principle of a provincial quota, so that now only the Union quota is used as the basis of delimitation. This is obtained as before, except that the number of seats to be divided is now 160 instead of 150. Secondly it adds two further considerations to be taken into account in drawing constituency boundaries. These are: "probability of increase or decrease of population", and "local authority and magisterial district boundaries." Thirdly, and perhaps most significantly, it permits the Commission in the case of

a constituency with an area of 10,000 square miles or more, to reduce the number of voters to 8,000 or "a number equal to seventy per cent of the quota, whichever is the greater". According to this provision, then, where, at least within a single province, the Commission could not formerly create a constituency that was more than 35.3% greater than the smallest, it is now possible for the largest constituency to be 64.3% greater than the smallest at the time of delimitation, and very much more than that at the time of voting.

A recurrent complaint since 1948 made by opponents of the Nationalist Government or by exponents of electoral reform was that the system of loading urban seats (mostly United Party) and unloading rural seats (mostly Nationalist) has favoured the National Party and enabled it to gain a majority of seats in spite of winning only a minority of votes. The author's study of these elections suggests that only in 1948 could this factor have had a significant effect on the results, and that even there it was improbable. The far greater variation in size now permitted may more readily affect results in the future, but this is only probable where the election results are already very close. While the change further favours the rural voter, its significance should, therefore, not be exaggerated.

Evidence has been adduced to show that the actual drawing of constituency boundaries, especially by the 1958 Delimitation

Commission, adversely affected the United Party in the elections conducted on the basis of that delimitation -i.e. the elections of 1958 and 1961¹. The implication is that the Delimitation Commissions appointed by the Nationalist Government have been biassed in favour of the National Party. If these charges are well founded (and it must be admitted that they tend to rest on a post hoc, propter hoc type of argument), one's reaction tends to be one of fatalistic acceptance of the fallibility of human institutions; for ever since the Act of Union the Delimitation Commission has been obligatorily composed of Judges of the Supreme Court. The only reform that suggests itself to the author as possible would require the recognition of the major parties by the constitution and the consultation of these parties in the appointment of the Commission. This would, however, itself create a number of difficulties, particularly of definition, while it is doubtful even then that all charges of bias would be totally eliminated.

2. The Franchise

The Act of Union provided that the franchise existing

1. See Farquharson, R.R. "South Africa 1958", in D.E. Butler (ed). Elections Abroad (MacMillan, London, 1959), and Shultz and Butler, "The South African General Election in 1961", in Political Science Quarterly, vol. 78, 1963.

in the four colonies prior to Union should continue to operate in the Union until Parliament should by law otherwise determine. The only limitation on this power was that contained in sections 35 and 152 which, as we have already seen, provided that the African and Coloured voters of the Cape should not have their rights diminished except by an Act that received a majority at its third reading of two-thirds of the total number of members of both Houses of Parliament meeting in joint session.

The first change in the franchise law came in 1930, when the Women's Enfranchisement Act was passed, extending the vote to adult White women. There was some argument in favour of extending the same right to Coloured women, but with a predominantly Nationalist government in power, such a proposal was hardly likely to succeed. The consequence, of course, was to increase the number of White voters relative to Coloured voters particularly in the Cape. This relative depreciation of the value of the Coloured vote was carried further in the following year when the Franchise Laws Amendment Act removed all existing qualifications other than that of age for White, but not for Coloured, voters. At the same time the qualifications applying to non-White voters were more rigorously applied. The following table illustrates the effect of these changes in the Cape Province¹.

1. These figures are from Leonard M. Thompson, The Republic of South Africa (Little, Brown, Boston, 1966), p.65.

	1929	1935
White voters	167,184	382,103
African voters	15,780	10,628
Coloured voters	25,618	24,793

In 1936 African voters were removed from the common roll in the Cape and placed on a separate roll for the purpose of electing three Natives' Representatives to the House of Assembly. This right was abolished by the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act, 1959, which purported to offer the Africans of the Cape a more valuable form of political self-expression in the form of the future Bantustan of the Transkei.

Following the 1936 precedent, Parliament in 1956, by revalidating the Separate Representation of Voters Act, 1951, placed the Coloured voters of the Cape on a separate roll for the purpose of electing four representatives to the House of Assembly. This measure was strongly contested by all opposition parties and by the Coloureds themselves. Its coming into effect produced a marked decline in the number of coloureds registered as voters in the Cape.

	1939	1945	1953	1959
Number of Coloured voters	28,273	52,285	47,677	24,306

Despite the continuing increase in the Coloured population, there seems little likelihood of any future increase in the

number of their representatives. It is significant that the increase in the number of "ordinary" seats in the House of Assembly in 1965 was not accompanied by any increase in the number of Coloureds' M.P.s. Indeed, there were stories in the press earlier this year that the Government was contemplating the abolition of Coloured representation in the House of Assembly. These stories may be unfounded, but a degree of insecurity certainly still attaches to the remaining voting rights of the Coloureds.

The last amendment to the franchise law was that made by Act No. 30 of 1958, which reduced the minimum age qualification for all White (but not Non-White) voters from twenty-one years to eighteen. The ostensible ground for this move was that given by the Minister of Defence: "if I may call on a boy or girl of eighteen years to defend their people, should they not also be in a position to make ¹ their cross?" Coming as the move did on the eve of the ² republican referendum, it would seem, however, that the two were not unconnected. If the estimate made by Die Nataller ³ is correct, this Act added some 150,000 new voters to the voters' roll. The ratio of Afrikaans-speaking

1. Die Burger. February 27, 1958.

2. See infra, pp. F 264 - F 268.

3. Die Nataller. August 8, 1958.

to English-speaking South Africans at that age level was 63.5 to 33.5. On that basis the Government would have reaped ¹ at least a potential net gain of approximately 46,000 voters .

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1. The Government's majority in the referendum was 74,580 votes.

B. THE SOUTH AFRICAN PARTY SYSTEM

Introduction

The party system in South Africa has its roots in the pre-Union period in South Africa. The Cape might have seemed to have held the key. It was not only the oldest, the largest, and the most populous of the four colonies, as they then were, but it was also the region with the longest continuous history of contact between White and Black, and between Boer and Briton. Moreover it had evolved a system of mutual adaptation that produced not only an attitude of co-operation between the two white groups, but also the Rhodes concept of a colour-blind "civilisation" test that held at least the promise of a fruitful co-operation between White and Black.

Even in the Cape, however, there were still the memories of past hostilities between the various sections of the population. Given time and continuing stability and tranquility, it is very likely that these memories would have faded into insignificance. But that gift was not granted. The Jameson Raid and the Anglo-Boer War re-opened the old rift between Boer and Briton; and, in the end, the negrophobia of the Northern descendants of the Voortrekkers found a response in the memories of the Cape Dutch of the "Kaffir" Wars.

That these developments would come to dominate the

politics of South Africa was, however, by no means apparent at the time. It is true that both the former republics were implacably opposed to the extension of political rights to the Africans of their territories, or, put positively, were dedicated to the cause of White supremacy. But there were hopes that Cape "liberalism" would combine with Smuts's flexibility to produce a gradual transformation in these attitudes. These hopes were reinforced by promising signs in the other major area of South African political conflict; for the Botha-Smuts régime in the Transvaal embarked on a policy of conspicuous reconciliation between Boer and Briton. The future, therefore, seemed to lie with a coalition between the moderates of the Cape and Botha and Smuts in the Transvaal.

From this picture both Natal and the Orange Free State were omitted. At the National Convention, Natal played its cards ineptly and it has continued to do so ever since. Its continuing lack of political acumen could not, perhaps, have been foreseen. But two factors in the Natal situation could, perhaps, have been brought into focus and their probable effects calculated. On the one hand not only was Natal the scene of the former bloody Zulu Wars, fought by the only really effective military régime among the Bantu of South Africa,¹ but it was

1. At one point the White population in Natal was saved from annihilation only by taking to boats in Durban Bay.

also the scene of the last armed conflict between White and Black - the Zulu Rebellion of 1906. With these relatively recent facts in mind, it was hardly likely that Natal, predominantly English-speaking though it might be, would enthusiastically embrace the "liberalism" of the Cape. Again, it was into Natal that the invading columns of the Boers thrust on the outbreak of the Anglo-Boer War, so threateningly indeed, that if the Boers had not stayed to besiege Ladysmith, Natal might well have been conquered. The British settlers fought back, but they would certainly have been overcome had it not been for the timely arrival of the Imperial troops. Natal had cause to be grateful to the Empire and it remained passionately loyal to it, to the exasperation of the Afrikaners, right down to 1961. Natal's loyalty to England and the Empire remained, however, essentially sentimental; it irritated the Afrikaners without itself being a dynamic political force. For its possible strength as a bastion of English political traditions was sapped by Natal's reactionary conservatism - or more accurately - elitism in the context of White-Black relations. Under these circumstances, it was politically disastrous that the solid core of resistance to Afrikaner nationalism came to be centred in Natal; for on the one hand it enabled this resistance to be condemned as mere jingoism, while on the other hand it prevented, or it at least was partly responsible for preventing, Natal from adopting a progressive racial policy as a counter-weight to Northern White supremacism.

The Orange Free State, for its part, held another key to the political future of South Africa. Originally the more adaptable of the two Republics, in the post-Boer War era that prefaced Union its two dominant political figures were ex-President Steyn and General Hertzog - both rigid and uncompromising, and tangible evidence of the fact that Afrikaner nationalism had not, and would not, gently wither away in the Botha-Smuts aura of "sweetness and light". And Hertzog it was who, two years after Union in his famous Smithfield "South Africa First" speech, embarked on a course that would lead to his ejection from the Botha Cabinet and to the formation of the National Party - the political instrument of Afrikaner nationalism.

1. The National Party

Given the differences in past experiences, in present outlook and future aspirations of the various White groups in the country, the emergence of the National Party sooner or later was probably inevitable. Moreover, the mutual suspicions and antagonisms of the two major white sections were accentuated down to the forties by the urban-rural clash of interests and the lack of contact between the groups that resulted from the fact that the majority of Afrikaners were country-dwellers while the majority of the English-speaking section lived in the

towns. Professor Sadie, in his report, has drawn particular attention, too, to the wide income-differential between the two groups that was present from the beginning of Union and was further accentuated by the depressions of the inter-war years. There were, of course, many English-speaking South Africans, probably a majority of them, who experienced hard times during this period; and, on the other hand, there were many Afrikaners who were prosperous and wealthy. But by and large the depressed or "poor white" section of the white population was also the Afrikaans-speaking section.

Disparities in income and educational attainment between the two major groups still remain striking and, indeed, still exert a strong political influence. The National Party has always been identified by Afrikaners as their "own" party; and this, too, has been claimed by the Party itself. An implicit "political contract" is the result: the duty of Afrikaners to support the Party (and the correlative right of the Party to expect this support) is matched by the duty of the Party (and of a Government representing it) to care for, to foster and to guard, the interests and well-being of the Afrikaner population (and the correlative right of Afrikaners to such care). While it has not been an exclusive doctrine, in a sense the Afrikaans section through the National Party, has anticipated Nkrumah's injunction, "Seek ye first the political kingdom . . ."

For its first twenty years, the National Party was the party of General Hertzog, just as the South African Party, from Botha's death in 1919 until Fusion in 1934, and the United Party from 1939 until his own death in 1950, were the parties of General Smuts.¹ And the parties reflected the differences of the two leaders: Hertzog, conservative and dogmatic on the rights of Afrikaners; Smuts eclectic and with a passion for building the larger "wholes" which he believed the future world demanded: the Union of South Africa (and the union of its peoples), the British Empire and Commonwealth, the League of Nations, the United Nations. Given the factors that have shaped the Afrikaner's attitudes, it was predictable that Hertzog's emphasis on "South Africa First" and on the rights of Afrikanerdom should appeal more wholeheartedly to his fellow-Afrikaners than could Smuts's eclecticism. Indeed, the wonder is that Smuts managed to retain the loyalty of so many Afrikaners for so long.²

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1. The story is told of a United Party worker who, driving a resident of an Inebriates' Home to the polls in 1953, asked his passenger if he knew whom he had to vote for. The reply given was, "Certainly, for General Smuts." There were, however, probably thousands who were not inebriates who still voted in spirit for Smuts rather than for a party or a policy.
 2. Perhaps the single most important reason for Smuts's relative success was the memory of his exploits in the second half of the Anglo-Boer War.

Hertzog, however, was not a rigid sectionalist. While he drew his inspiration from his Afrikaner roots, he never turned his face against the English-speaking community. In his 1912 speeches at Nylstroom, Smithfield and De Wildt, his target was not English-speaking South Africans, but "foreign adventurers" (mostly English-speaking, it is true) who sought to run the country without fully identifying with it. "They had reached national manhood," he was reported as saying, "and they felt that South Africans and not strangers should rule the country. Formerly they had been governed by people who were not South Africans ... Now that they were capable of ruling themselves they would no longer allow themselves to be ruled by those who were not South Africans."¹ At the same time, however, he warned his audiences that while he would "respect" Imperialism when it was "useful" to South Africa, he would regard it as an "enemy" if ever Imperial interests and South African interest conflicted.² And on the language question he was reported as saying:

The Dutch were the least aggressive people in the world. At the Show he noticed everything was in English, though to say the least of it half those present and interested were Dutch-speaking. Would not, if circumstances had been reversed, the English section have claimed half a share? Nobody could abandon the people's language rights without stigmatising himself as a traitor ... There were all

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1. D.W. Kruger, South African Parties and Policies, 1910-1960: A Select Source Book (Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1960), p. 64.
 2. Ibid., p. 66.

equals, and the Dutch people would not yield one inch on the question of practical equality of language, for he was not an advocate of mere form. ¹

A political storm raged over the expression of these sentiments, and as a result Hertzog was ejected from the Cabinet and he turned to the formation of the National Party. To the Afrikaners, therefore, he was able to stand as a champion of their rights, as one who had been sacrificed by Botha and Smuts in order to appease the jingoes. Hertzog had to wait until 1924, however, before he was able to enjoy political power; and it was only then, too, that his policies could be tested in action. Even then, however, his power was incomplete. The National Party's strength in the House of Assembly increased from 45 seats before the election to 63 after it, while the South African Party lost twenty-five seats and now held only 54. But Hertzog was still five seats short of a majority. He found the support necessary to form a government as a result of a "pact" with the Labour Party, whose own strength rose from ten to seventeen. The Labour Party was predominantly an English-speaking party, and three English-speaking South Africans were accordingly included in the "Pact" Government: Cresswell, Boydell and Madeley (later replaced by Sampson). This pact represented a degree of common class interest, a common front against the capitalist (mainly English and Jewish)

1. Ibid., p. 62.

element, but it still might not have been brought into being without Smuts's ruthless suppression of the 1922 Rand strike, including the hanging of five of its leaders.¹ But there was little other common ground between the parties. The presence of the Labour Party held the National Party's republicanism in check, while the Labour Party was obliged to soft-pedal its socialism. In spite of certain tensions between the two parties, however, the pact was renewed in 1929 and although in the general election of that year Hertzog secured an over-all majority² and although the Labour Party representation dropped to only eight seats, two Labour members (Cresswell and Sampson) were retained in the Cabinet.

What Hertzog accomplished during the period 1924-1933 laid the basis of the present Republic of South Africa. Afrikaans was recognized as an official language of the Union, and the process of "afrikanerizing" the Civil Service was begun,³

1. It was more a revolt, reminiscent of the Paris commune, than a mere strike.

2. The National Party had 78 members in a House of 148.

3. Cf. Oswald Pirow, James Barry Munnik Hertzog (Howard Timmins, Cape Town, n.d.), p. 127:

In March 1925 of 13,000 officials there were 3,792 who could speak only English and only 12 who were Afrikaans unilingual. Between 1924 and 1927 there were 915 Afrikaans-speaking and 934 English-speaking appointments in the clerical division and in other sections 2,209 Afrikaans-speaking and 1,783 English-speaking. Of those promoted in the administrative and clerical divisions, 354 were Afrikaans-speaking and 833 English-speaking; in the general division 275 Afrikaans-speaking and 334 English-speaking. Of 'qualified' persons appointed, 517 were English-speaking and 467 Afrikaans-speaking, and of these 360 of the former and 193 of the latter were promoted.

the Union Flag was recognized as a National Flag, and Die Stem van Suid-Afrika placed on an equal footing with God Save the King. And the seal was placed on these developments by the Balfour Definition of Dominion Status accepted by the Imperial Conference, 1926, and by the Statute of Westminster, 1931. The former is interpreted by Nationalists as a personal triumph for Hertzog (and Mackenzie King's role is correspondingly diminished). Pirow thus writes:

The high-water mark in General Hertzog's career as a Prime Minister was undoubtedly his victory at the 1926 Imperial Conference, when he persuaded Great Britain to sweep away the last vestiges of the Treat of Vereeniging¹ by recognizing all the Dominions as full and equal partners on a purely voluntary basis.²

Hertzog indeed regarded the Balfour Declaration and the Statute of Westminster as fully satisfying South Africa's national aspirations. As far as he was concerned, South Africa was now fully independent and could, if it so desired, at any time unilaterally secede from the Commonwealth.

With so much, from the Afrikaner point of view, accomplished, Hertzog was psychologically prepared to seek a truce to Afrikaner-English tension and to concentrate rather on harmony. The precondition to such harmony had always been, to his mind, a basis of real equality - which, in practice,

1. Marking the end of the Anglo-Boer War.

2. Op.cit., p. 101.

meant the full recognition of the Afrikaans language and of the Afrikaner's place in South African society, coupled with the full recognition, internationally and vis-à-vis the Commonwealth, of South Africa's nationhood. With the passing of the Statute of Westminster at the end of 1931, Hertzog was satisfied that these conditions had been met.

It was at this point that the depression, the gold standard crisis, Tielman Roos's barnstorming campaign in favour of coalition, and, perhaps above all, a series of Nationalist by-election reverses, eventually persuaded Hertzog to respond to Smuts's offer of a coalition to end the party conflict. Hertzog's decision was accepted by some of his followers only with the gravest of reservations. Dr. Malan, leader of the National Party in the Cape, was the major spokesman for the doubters, and his declaration on the approaching coalition made it quite clear that future trouble was in store. In this statement, Malan declared:

...for the present we will submit to the coalition, not because we approve of it or ever can approve, but simply and only because it has been forced on our party as an accomplished fact. We submit, therefore, under protest ...

As long as the Coalition-government lasts, it will be a period of the very greatest danger for our party ...

During the period of danger we regard it as our firm and sacred duty to look after our party and our people's interests ... The duty individually and collectively to be on guard rests especially

on party members and members of Parliament outside the Cabinet. It would be fatal if in this time of danger they handed themselves over bound hand and foot to the coalition government however much they trust their own representatives in the Cabinet. It would be the grossest disloyalty and faithlessness if they now forget that they, as Nationalists, are not soldiers in a personal body guard, but, rather, soldiers in an army whose highest duty is to protect the people (volk).¹

If this was the attitude to a coalition, it was hardly to be expected that Malan and his followers would gladly follow Hertzog into a "fusion" with Smuts's South African Party. Fusion, it is true, was represented as a re-uniting of the Afrikaner people, an end to the schism that stemmed from the Botha-Hertzog split and which grieved the Afrikaner in his yearning for volkseenheid.² This might even have appealed to Malan, but to his mind there was one fatal flaw: Smuts had sold his soul to the Imperialists and the jingoes; he had led the country into "Britain's war" in 1914, crushing the 1914 rebellion on the way; he had taken the jingo Unionist party into his fold; he had opposed every measure that promoted South Africa's nationhood. Hertzog, however, agreed to coalition with

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1. D.F. Malan, Afrikaner-Volkseenheid, en my Ervarings op die Pad daarheen (N.B.P., Cape Town, 1959), pp. 161 and 162. Translated.
 2. "oneness of the people."

Smuts because he believed that the Nationalists would suffer a lasting defeat if they continued on their own and that their cause would, therefore, suffer a grave, perhaps fatal, set-back. Perhaps, too, he believed that as Prime Minister and Leader of the new party (Smuts agreed to take the lower post of Deputy-Prime Minister), he would be able to ensure that the essential objectives and interests of the Afrikaner section were secured. This did not, however, enable Hertzog to escape the same fate that had earlier overtaken Smuts. Pirow, Hertzog's admirer and disciple, describes this fate in a way that is accurate in substance even if over-coloured in language:

The man who had raised Afrikanerdom from the ashes of the Anglo-Boer War was called a traitor to his nation. The man whose word had never been doubted by the most rabid jingo was branded a liar by some of his own people. These poisonous attacks marked the real beginning of the Hertzog tragedy which ended with his premature death. They made it inevitable that the reconciliation between Hertzog and Malan which took place on the outbreak of the Second World War would be temporary only and would be followed by fresh intrigues until Hertzog was finally broken.

For the moment, however, Malan and his supporters were the only significant element of dissent in the country, and the optimists of the time hoped that they were only a

1. Op. cit., p. 1.

transient relic of an outworn controversy. It seemed that "racial peace" (i.e. between the two White groupes) had at last descended upon the Union. With even less foundation, it was hoped that the twin statutes comprising the 1936 "settlement" of the "Native Question"¹ would provide a permanent basis for race relations in the future.

That Malan did stand firm, however, and refuse to join the new party, has since proved to be one of the decisive acts of South African history. Following his lead, the Cape Provincial Congress of the National Party voted by 164 votes to 18 against disbanding, and minorities in the Orange Free State and the Transvaal likewise stood firm. In Parliament, nineteen members formed the "rump" of the National Party, fourteen from the Cape, four from the Free State, and one from the Transvaal. The result was the retention in being of the, or perhaps "a", National Party, now under the leadership of Dr.

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1. The Representation of Natives Act, 1936, removed "Native" voters in the Cape from the common roll and instead provided for three separately elected M.P.s from the Cape, and for four indirectly elected Senators. The Native Trust and Land Act, 1936, provided for the establishment of a Native Trust Fund to be administered by a corporate body, the Native Trust. "The main object of the Trust is to acquire land for Natives, to develop land, to advance the interests of Natives in scheduled Native areas, and generally to assist and develop the material, moral and social well-being of Natives residing on Trust land." H.J. May, The South African Constitution (Juta, Cape Town, 3rd ed., 1955), p. 442.

Malan, popularly referred to as the "Purified" (Gesuiwerde) National Party, or in abbreviated form as the Gesuiwerdes or sometimes simply as the Malanites. This party now formed the official opposition in Parliament; and although numerically it was weak and easily over-ridden by the Government's enormous majority it had a solid base in the Cape, a consistency of purpose and unity of ideology that the new United Party lacked, and, in the end, an appeal to the increasingly solid sense of Afrikanerdom that was to prove far more powerful than the "South Africanism" of the United Party. In its task of re-building it was considerably aided by other associations and organizations dedicated to the task of building up and sustaining a sense of common Afrikaner purpose: the Broederbond, the Federasie van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigings, the Reddingsdaadbond and the Handelsinstituut, to name but some of the most important. The Gesuiwerdes were themselves active in all these fields. Individually and collectively they identified themselves with the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, with the interests and concerns of the volk.

Nevertheless, its road to political success must have seemed hard and long. In the 1938 general elections Hertzog and Smuts tested the strength of Fusion among the electorate for the first time and could be well satisfied with the results. The loss of six seats was regrettable, but hardly important when the fall was from 117 to 111. The Gesuiwerdes increased

their strength to 27 but still remained no real threat. On the other hand, the Dominion Party, the English-speaking opposition to Fusion mustered only 8 seats, mainly concentrated in Durban, the centre of jingoism, as it was regarded, in the Union but not of it, a law unto itself, and of no real account. The Labour Party, too, held only a meagre three seats, and there was one Socialist.

The fortunes of the National Party were, however, soon to receive an enormous windfall from fortuitous circumstance - the outbreak of the Second World War. At Fusion Hertzog and Smuts had left unresolved their differences of opinion over such issues as the divisibility of the Crown, the right of unilateral secession from the Commonwealth, and the right to remain neutral in a war in which Britain was a belligerent. When war did break out, Hertzog argued that it did not concern South Africa in any way. The peace and security and the vital interests of South Africa were not endangered. And he accordingly moved that South Africa remain neutral in the conflict, as she had every right to do. Smuts, for his part, argued, firstly, that South Africa's interests were integrally bound to Britain and the Commonwealth, and, secondly, that Hitler's aggressive policies endangered all small states. On both counts he urged that South Africa commit herself to the conflict on the side of Britain. Supported by the Dominion and Labour members as well as by the three Natives' Representatives,

Smuts won a narrow victory in the House of Assembly by 81 votes to 67. As a result, South Africa declared war on Germany, and Fusion was at an end. For Hertzog and his followers in the United Party, it was now patent that Smuts and those who voted with him, put the interests of Britain before those of South Africa and had no real belief in South Africa's independent nationhood. They therefore came to adopt the view that the Malanites had held all along, that South Africa could assert its own true identity only as an independent republic wholly divorced from Britain and the Commonwealth.

On his defeat in Parliament, Hertzog expected the Governor-General to grant his request for a dissolution. This, however, was refused on the ground that the state of opinion in the country was dangerously inflamed, and in the expectation that Smuts would be able to form a government with majority support. This expectation was realised, and Smuts accordingly became Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government with Dominion and Labour Party support. Hertzog, for his part, confidently expected to resume his grasp of the reins of the National Party and to be accepted as its Leader, as though the previous five or six years had not happened. In this he was to be sadly disappointed.

The years between the outbreak of war and the general election of 1943 indeed formed the period that more than any

other imperilled the Afrikaans nationalist movement. Neither before nor since has it been so variously or so acutely divided. There were the Hertzogites who hoped to take over the National Party once again, there was the semi-fascist New Order, the Nazi-inclined Ossewa-Brandwag, led by Dr. van Rensburg, former Administrator of the Free State, the out-and-out Nazi Grey Shirts, and there remained the hard-core Gesuiwerdes - men such as Malan, Strijdom, Verwoerd (all to become Primes Ministers), C.R. Swart (to become the Union's last Governor-General and the Republic's first President), Eric Louw, Dr. Dünge. There was also, it is true, an immense wave of popular sentiment in favour of Hereniging (re-union); but the bitterness and suspicions of the preceding years proved too great an obstacle.

The more the anti-war feeling rose amongst the Afrikaners [writes Pirow],¹ the easier it became to deplore the attitude of General Hertzog, 'who had become so accustomed to fraternising with the English that he was still protecting them whenever he made a speech or wrote a letter.'

Gradually these men succeeded in replacing the Hertzog of the 4th of September 1939, the man who sacrificed his career for his people, by a Hertzog who split Afrikanerdom in 1933 and was still the grand protector of the English enemy'.

The National Party, in the first flush of

1. Op. cit., p. 255.

enthusiasm, renamed itself the Herenigde Nasionale Party (Re-united National Party), but for a further year negotiations between Hertzog and Malan dragged out before they finally collapsed with Hertzog's defeat - the end probably hoped for, possibly engineered, by the Malanites. The immediate occasion was the Orange Free State Provincial Congress of November 1940. Its main business was to consider the proposed programme adopted by Malan's Federal Council. This programme pledged equality of "language and cultural" rights to the English-speaking section; but Hertzog suspected that this pledge might be used to disguise an inferior status for the English-speaking people.¹ He therefore proposed an amendment to include the word "political" among the rights to be guaranteed. This proposal was rejected by a large majority, and Hertzog, Havenga and his few supporters walked out. Shattered by his defeat, Hertzog resigned from the party and retired from politics; and he died two years later.

Out of this defeat a new party was born, the Afrikaner Party, led by N.D. Havenga, Hertzog's faithful follower and one of the most respected figures in South African politics. This party sought to embody the moderate elements of Hertzog's principles, and, in particular, the concept of mutual respect

1. This suspicion was probably well-founded, at least on the evidence of the 1942 "draft republican constitution".

between the two sections based on the full recognition of each other's rights. In this period of fervent nationalism, it had, however, little chance of survival. In effect, it merely added another element of division in the already divided Afrikanerdom.

The main conflict that now engaged Afrikaners, however, was that between the National Party and the Ossewa-Brandwag; and, for a while, the outcome was by no means certain. During this period of uncertainty there was again a strong movement in favour of reconciliation - a movement which the leaders of neither faction could for the time being ignore, let alone openly flout. And it was during this period of searching for common ground that the 1942 "draft constitution" was drawn up and was approved by Dr. Malan,¹ among others. The only real point of debate concerned the timing of its publication, not its content.

The 1942 "draft constitution" looked back to the models of the old Boer Republics and, reflecting the prevailing

1. Die Transvaler (whose editor was Dr. Verwoerd) when it finally published the Draft, stated: "It is published with the permission and on the authority of Dr. D.F. Malan, leader of the Herenigde Nasional or Volks party ... a thorough comparison of this Draft and the Party Programme of Principles and Action will show very plainly that the Party and its chief leader have accepted the Draft in its principles and broad outline." W.H. Vatcher, White Laager: the Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism (Praeger, New York, 1965), pp. 70-1.

Nationalist disenchantment with Western parliamentary democracy, favoured a more authoritarian structure for the State. It was not a Nazi document, for Malan constantly warned his followers against the acceptance of "foreign ideologies" as advocated by the O.B., the New Order and others. But to non-Nationalists, English- and Afrikaans-speaking alike, it was still an alarming document. According to the Draft¹ the Republic would abolish the "British Kingship" and the status of British subject, the Vierkleur (Four Colours) of the South African (Transvaal) Republic would be the National Flag, and Die Stem van Suid-Afrika the National Anthem. "Afrikaans," it stated, "as the language of the original white inhabitants of the country, will be the first official language. English - the second or supplementary language will enjoy equal rights and freedom with the first official language, everywhere and whenever - such treatment is judged by the State authority to be in the best interests of the State and its inhabitants."

If that was not enough to alarm English-speaking citizens, worse was to follow, for the draft went on to declare: White subjects, who are acknowledged as members of the State, will be called Burgers ... Such recognition will be only accorded to subjects of

1. The ensuing details are taken from the extracts of the Draft published in Vatcher, op. cit., pp. 71-73.

whom it can be expected that they will act as builders-up of the nation, ... whatever status they might have possessed before.

The State President (on whose mode of election the Draft was silent) was declared to be "directly and only responsible to God", and for his deeds and actions he was to be "altogether independent of any vote in Parliament". While he was to be assisted by a "Head Minister" and Executive Council, he had the power to dismiss any of them, and he could also send messages to Parliament indicating "the direction" he thought that body should take. Moreover the President was empowered to declare a state of emergency during which he could suspend the "customary obligations" of the Constitution and grant full powers to the Head Minister and Executive Council for the government of the Republic, "which must, however, be carried out under the direct supervision of the State President and will only continue as long as it meets with his approval."

It was clear that the Draft was bound to alienate English-speaking and moderate Afrikaans-speaking South Africans, and it was equally clear that the document was aimed not at them, but at "nationally minded" Afrikaners. If its publication reflected any strategy, that strategy must have been based on the view that the Republic would have to be established exclusively by Afrikaners; for only in this way could a republic that would embody the ideals of Afrikanerdom

be ensured. If however, the Draft was also intended to consolidate Afrikaner sentiment behind the National Party, it failed in its purpose; for back-biting and intrigue continued to plague Afrikaner political movements. Through all these manoeuvres Malan moved with an adamantine firmness, determined to establish the Party as the exclusive political mouthpiece of Afrikanerdom, and refusing to compromise with his rivals. And in that policy he eventually succeeded.

His opportunity to establish his position came with the 1943 general election. This was an election that was remarkable for the number of minor party and independent candidates. Altogether 85 such candidates' names appeared on the ballot papers. They included 12 Labour Party candidates, 9 Dominionites, 9 Communists, 22 Afrikaner Party candidates, and 34 Independents. Neither the Ossewa-Brandwag nor the New Order entered official candidates, but a small number of them entered the list in the guise of Independents. The main internal struggle among the Afrikaners was, therefore, that between the Afrikaner Party and the Nationalists. In this field the results were even more decisive than in the broader contest between the United Party and the Nationalists. In the latter contest the results were highly gratifying to Smuts and his supporters, for the United Party won 89 seats, and with the 9 Labour M.P.s, 7 Dominionites and 2 Independents, enjoyed a crushing majority over the 43 successful Nationalists.

The results certainly vindicated Smuts, but they also vindicated Malan in his tactics with his more immediate rivals. By refusing any electoral alliance and rejecting all compromise, he was able to crush them. The chief victim was the Afrikaner Party. Ten of its candidates lost their deposits,¹ and only two candidates (of whom one was N.C. Havenga) polled more than one-fifth of the total poll, the percentage in both cases being a mere 22.5 per cent. In every constituency contested by the Afrikaner Party, the National Party candidate by far outstripped his Afrikaner Party opponent. "The rebels against Malan's leadership," write the authors of the definitive history of the period, "had been simply annihilated."² They state further:

The Herzogites, the Pirowites, the O.B., had all challenged the claim of [Malan] and the H.N.P. to be the sole representatives of Nationalist Afrikanerdom. The challenge had been met, and from the electoral battle the H.N.P. had emerged victor. It had made good its boasted monopoly. It stood now, the sole effective organ of Afrikanerdom, compact, purified, and beyond the reach of revenge.³

Dr. Malan has himself recorded his reaction to the election results. After admitting the blow suffered in the

1. By polling less than one-fifth of the vote of the successful candidate.
2. Michael Roberts and A.E.G. Trollip, The South African Opposition, 1939-1945 (Longmans, London, 1947), p. 160.
3. Ibid., p. 161.

number of seats lost, he goes on to say that he still was not discouraged:

On the contrary, for me it was the sign that the dawn of triumph had begun to break through on the political eastern horizon. This election was indeed a purifying process, with the prospect that there would now come an end to the humiliating spectacle of three separate National-minded groups¹ on the Opposition benches. My message to the National-minded section of our people had therefore read as follows: The Afrikaner people have now had an opportunity to pronounce upon that humiliating and destructive division, and its judgement was unequivocal. The Opposition is now one, and only one, consolidated whole. And may that also be the announcement of the triumph to come!²

During the following years, the H.N.P.'s ascendancy in Afrikaner nationalist politics was consolidated, as was, at the same time, Malan's personal pre-eminence. The Ossewa-Brandwag and the New Order both disappeared as effective forces, although the former remained as a bone of contention between the Afrikaner and the H.N.P. In 1947, however, after prolonged negotiations³ and in spite of opposition from some of Malan's supporters (including Strijdom and Swart⁴), an election agreement was reached between the two parties, the

1. The Herenigde Nasionale Party, the Afrikaner Party and the New Order.
2. Op.cit., p. 229. Translated.
3. Cf. Gwendolen M. Carter, The Politics of Inequality (Thames and Hudson, London, 1948), pp. 240-242.
4. C.F. Malan, op.cit., p. 234.

Afrikaner Party being given ten seats to fight in which the H.N.P. would offer no candidates.

Although the H.N.P. went into the 1948 election in alliance with the Afrikaner Party, there was no doubt as to who was the senior partner. Indeed with considerable adroitness, Malan not only determined the alliance's electoral strategy, but was also able to determine the ground on which the election was fought. This he accomplished in his reply to the Speech from the Throne at the opening of the 1948 session. There he attacked the unpopular provision for limited Indian representation in Parliament and in the Natal Provincial Council, played on the dangers of Communism and threats to "European civilisation", and announced his policy of apartheid. These were issues that touched the hearts, or at least the fears and prejudices, of the electorate. The British Commonwealth, by the admission of India, Pakistan and Ceylon, had ceased to be a cosy circle of like-minded White nations, and was clearly moving in a direction opposed to that of South Africa. The United Nations, with which, too, although less justly, Smuts was identified was already turning into a forum in which South Africa was subjected to the attacks of Asian powers, notably India. A new and alarming wave of nationalism had swept across Southeast Asia and was now advancing in Africa. The Cold War was reaching its peak and a frightening alliance of Communism and anti-colonialism

threatened the security of the Western world in general and of the white man in South Africa in particular. Malan's answer to these disquieting portents was, in effect, to stand firm and preserve intact the edifice which our forefathers had built.

Will the European race [the H.N.P. Manifesto asked] in the future be able, but also want to maintain its rule, its purity, and its civilisation, or will it float along until it vanishes forever, without honor, in the black sea of South Africa's non-European population?

This rhetorical question set the tone of the H.N.P. election campaign. It proposed, with regard to "Natives", to strengthen influx control in order to halt the stream into the towns, to abolish the Natives' Representative Council and the Natives' Representation in the House of Assembly and the Cape Provincial Council, to establish instead a new system of Native local self-government, and to provide separate institutions of higher education for Africans who would be excluded from white institutions. It proposed to substitute separate representation of Coloureds for the voting rights in the Cape that they currently enjoyed. Indians (Asians) were to be repatriated if possible but those that remained would be subject to new and severe restrictions. Finally the Party promised "to purify our State and public services of Communists and Communist influences", to prohibit Communist immigrants and literature and to dissolve the Communist Party.

As well the H.N.P. exploited the post-war reaction to continuing measures of economic austerity, ex-servicemen's dissatisfactions, and the Hofmeyr "bogey". Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts's brilliant lieutenant, was subjected to a merciless campaign of vilification. Although not a Liberal in the modern party sense of the term, Hofmeyr was a champion of non-White rights and preached in season and out the universal brotherhood of man. The Nationalists depicted him as the imminent successor to Smuts, and asserted that if he became Prime Minister he would lead White South Africa to extinction under the banner of Equality.¹

These tactics succeeded to an extent not even expected by the Nationalists themselves, let alone by the United Party. Where it had won 43 seats in 1943, it won 70 in 1948, and in addition, the Afrikaner Party won 9 out of the 10 seats it contested. The total membership of the House of Assembly was 153: 150 ordinary members and 3 Natives' Representatives. The H.N.P. and Afrikaner Party together, then, mustered 79 seats as against a total of 74 others. Thus Dr. Malan, the dour, uncompromising, incorruptible champion of Afrikanerdom and White Civilization, became Prime Minister at the head of a coalition government that included Havenga as Deputy-Prime Minister.

1. See Alan Paton, Hofmeyr (Oxford University Press, Cape Town, 1962), pp. 475-87.

His majority was slender - excluding the Speaker, a mere four votes - but he proceeded to grant representation to South West Africa and thus gain a further six seats. His position was thus secured.

The accession of the six South West African seats while it did not wholly abolish, nevertheless, considerably diminished the H.N.P.'s dependence on the Afrikaner Party, and correspondingly reduced the latter's bargaining power. It seemed reasonably certain, moreover, that in the near future the H.N.P. would be able to crush the Afrikaner Party out of existence as it had crushed the other Afrikaner political groups.¹

Faced with this situation, Havenga capitulated. The key issue which had prevented amalgamation had been the removal of Coloured voters from the common roll, which Malan regarded as an essential element in his programme but which Havenga had thus far resisted. A statement issued as late as the end of 1949 made it known that a Bill to provide for the separate representation for Coloured voters would be published for purposes of information and discussion, but further

1. The Provincial Council elections in March 1949, moreover, "proved... conclusively that the Afrikaner Party had no bargaining power outside its immediate parliamentary strength... and meant that it would be only a question of time before the Afrikaner Party would lose its identity." Carter, op.cit., p. 246-7.

explained that the Afrikaner Party would not accept responsibility for it, because it disagreed with the H.N.P. on the question of whether the entrenched clauses of the constitution applied and also on the number of Coloureds' representatives to be given in compensation. In October 1950, however, Malan agreed to increase the number of these representatives to four. In addition, the Coloureds in the Cape were to be given the right to elect one Senator and two Provincial Councillors. On this basis Havenga announced that he was satisfied that the Coloured voters would be gaining rather than losing voting strength and that in his view the entrenched clauses therefore no longer applied. To the Government's opponents, it seemed that Havenga had betrayed his integrity for the sake of preserving his place in the Cabinet.¹ To Afrikaner nationalists, however, the last dividing principle had been removed, and it seemed appropriate that the unity of the spirit be made manifest by a unity in the flesh.

In 1950 this formal unity was achieved. It was preceded in June by an announcement that the enlarged party would

1. On his retirement in 1954, Malan sought to secure Havenga as his successor. Was this part of a bargain made in 1950, or possibly 1951 (on amalgamation)? It is possible, but one cannot be more positive than that. In his last few years of office Malan came to regard Havenga as his closest associate.

be named the National Party, the name "that formerly described the political home of both our co-operating parties, and also included all nationally-minded Afrikaners from both white language groups." As a result, it proclaimed, "Afrikanerdom has risen out of the condition of disunity, impotence and mortification in which it found itself... regained its self-respect, and has reached a climax of unity and power."¹ For Malan, the outcome must have been immensely satisfying. He had achieved complete re-unification without having to compromise let alone sacrifice a single principle. In effect, the Gesuiwerdes now swallowed up those who had abandoned them seventeen years ago in order to join with Smuts in Fusion. Poetic justice, indeed!

In 1952 the re-formed National Party adopted a revised programme. The Christian-national character of this programme was clearly apparent. The party acknowledged "the sovereignty and guidance of God in the destiny of countries" and stated its object to be "the development of our nation's life along Christian-national lines". It sought to promote unity "founded on a common and undivided loyalty and devotion to South Africa." In education, it urged that "the Christian-

1. Rand Daily Mail, June 25, 1951, quoted in Carter, op.cit., p. 248.

national basis of the State should be fully taken into account." Under a section headed "Public Morality" (in itself indicative of the Calvinist basis of the party), it stated that it recognized "the duty of the authorities to respect and preserve the Sunday as a day of rest in the public sphere, to oppose all unchristian practices in the national life, and to maintain a high moral code, at the same time taking into consideration the freedom of the individual citizen in his own sphere."

On constitutional matters, the party emphasized the independent status of the State and undertook "to remove any inconsistency hampering the fullest realisation of that independence". It further stated its conviction "that the republican form of state, separated from the British Crown, is the form best adapted to the traditions, circumstances and aspirations of the South African nation, and is also the only effective guarantee that South Africa will not again be drawn into Great Britain's wars." But it further stipulated that a republic could be established only "on the broad basis of the national will, and with the faithful observance of the equal language and cultural rights of the two sections of the European population"; and that this "broad basis" should be ascertained only by "a special and definite mandate" by a means other than an ordinary election. As to bilingualism, it pledged itself to apply the principle faithfully, "not

only in the various departments of the Civil Service, but also in all parts of the Provincial Administration and in all public administrative bodies in State or State-aided institutions."

In the field of race relations, the party rested itself fundamentally on the old concept of "Christian trusteeship," implying, whatever else, the idea of tutelage. It firmly rejected "every attempt which might lead to the mixing of European and non-European blood."¹ On the positive side, it based itself on the doctrine that the non-European races should be given "the opportunity to develop themselves, each race in its own field, in both material and spiritual spheres, in keeping with their natural gifts and abilities", and that the races should be territorially and politically segregated² - in short, apartheid.

It was well for the Nationalists that they were able to draw together, for they were engaged from 1951 to 1956 in probably the most bitter of the many bitter political struggles

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1. It was specifically on this count that the Prime Minister refused to accept the inclusion of Maoris in a projected tour of New Zealand rugby players in 1965.
 2. Significantly, it does not go so far as to advocate economic segregation. All opposition parties argue that increasing economic integration (in the sense of interdependence) is a fatal barrier to the realisation of territorial and political apartheid.

in the Union's history. With their slender majority (even with the S.W.A. seats added) the National Party Government sought to legislate to remove the Coloured voters from the common roll, when, according to the terms of the constitution, a two-thirds majority of the total membership of both Houses of Parliament, was required. And it persisted in this course in Parliament, in the Courts, and in the country not only in disregard of the smallness of its majority but also in defiance of past assurances to the contrary by many of the Party's leaders (including Dr. Malan and Mr. Swart) and despite the fact that in the 1948 elections they gained only a minority of votes cast.¹ And what is more, it did so despite the most massive, the most enraged and the most determined opposition both in Parliament and out that any item of proposed legislation has probably ever encountered, an opposition that went to the utmost short of civil disobedience.

The whole incident was of the highest significance. In the first place, by his actions Malan demonstrated that he was leading the National Party away from the traditions of Hertzog, and that in two respects: firstly, his determination to act in spite of his lack of a two-thirds majority, and in spite of the vehemence of the opposition, contrasted with

1. In the seats contested the H.N.P. and A.P. together polled 41.2% of the votes, and if allowance is made for uncontested seats this figure drops to 39.4%.

Hertzog's patience in his attempts to secure the separate representation of Africans;¹ secondly, Hertzog had always regarded the Coloureds as "appendages to the Whites" rather than as a separate racial bloc and in 1926, at least, proposed to extend their voting rights to the two former republics. He would never, as far as one can tell, have lent his support to Malan's proposal.

In the second place, Malan demonstrated the totality of his apartheid concept. The Separate Representation of Voters Act belongs in the same category as the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act, the Group Areas Act, the Extension of University Education Act,² the Immorality Act, the Mixed Marriages Act, the Population Registration Act, and others. These and other Acts ensure the maintenance of separate racial categories for all persons in South Africa, the Coloureds forming one such distinct category, and provide that in virtually all public as well as in many private spheres, the individual lives and acts within the bounds of his own racial category. The fundamental objection to the presence of

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1. His first bill on the subject was tabled in 1926 and subsequently withdrawn. He tried again in 1929, again without success; and it was only at the head of the Fusion government that he finally secured the passage of the Representation of Natives Act, with only eleven dissentient votes in a joint sitting.
 2. This act established separate university Colleges for Africans, Indians and Coloureds respectively, and excluded their registration at "White" Universities.

Coloured voters on the common roll was that they voted along with white voters for the same candidates, and moreover, in a number of constituencies, held the balance of power between Nationalist and non-Nationalist White voters. Not only did this lose Nationalist seats, but, gravest injury of all, it was Coloured voters who were responsible for the defeat or ware (true) Afrikaners.

In the third place, the Government demonstrated that the only public opinion to which it recognised a duty of responsiveness was the public opinion of the Afrikaner section. Throughout the constitutional struggle, the Government justified its persistence - through the attempt to convert Parliament in a final Court of Appeal on constitutional matters and through the enlargement of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court to its final device of packing the Senate - on two main grounds: the need to establish the sovereignty of Parliament, and the duty to act in accordance with the will of the people. The National Party throughout its history (and under its various names) had always based itself in part on an appeal to the Afrikaner's fear of the Swart Gevaar (Black Danger), on the need to achieve a republic, and on its claim to be the political arm of the Afrikaner people. On the present occasion, the Opposition and the Courts, by asserting the supremacy of the constitution, denied sovereignty to Parliament, and pro tanto (so the argument ran) to the

South African State itself. This denial of sovereignty not only ran counter to the Afrikaner nationalists' sense of national pride, it threatened their most treasured possession, the Western-Christian culture. And all this, despite the declaration of the "will of the people" both in the 1948 and in the 1953 general elections. But, as we have seen, in 1948 only about 40% of "the people" - i.e. the predominantly white electorate - voted for the Government coalition and in 1953 the voter support was probably still less than 45%.¹ Moreover, the voters who voted for the Party were almost exclusively Afrikaners. The "will of the people" in effect, then meant the will of nationalist Afrikanerdom. The National Party (and the government representing it) had, indeed, an almost Rousseauian conception of the role of government. The general will must be sovereign and the government its servant and interpreter. In the South African context, the general will, however, is the will of "true" (i.e. nationalist) Afrikaners. The government, therefore, has an undeviating obligation to fulfil that will, however much it may be opposed by un-national elements. Indeed since "true" Afrikaners are recognised by the fact that they support the Government (a certain circularity intrudes into the argument at this point), those who oppose the Government whether by votes, or by speech, or

1. On the author's estimates for uncontested seats, the National Party's support was 44.5%.

demonstration or protest, by their very acts prove that they are "un-national" in their outlook, and are thus essentially opposed to South Africa's own true interests. It is, therefore, not only right, it is obligatory to ignore such opposition.

The 1953 general elections proved, moreover, that the path of duty thus conceived was also politically profitable. In spite of the combined efforts of the Labour Party, the Torch Commando and the United Party which together formed the United Front, in spite of the fact that the United Front brought a drive and efficiency to bear on the elections that matched those of the National Party, and in spite of the increasing number of restrictions placed on individual liberties,¹ the National Party actually increased its majority. After the final results were announced, the National Party held 94 seats out of a total of 159: an overall majority of 29 seats. Moreover, in terms of votes, not only did the Party increase its total share of the votes from an estimated 39.4% in 1948 to an estimated 44.5% in 1953, but the swing in its favour was remarkably persistent.

This election the National Party had fought on much the same ground as it had fought the 1948 election: it

1. Notably by means of the Suppression of Communism Act, 1950, the Public Safety Act, 1953, and the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1953.

represented itself as the defender of White-Christian civilization against the twin dangers of Communism and race extinction; as the expression of national devotion ("Love what is our own - South Africa - our home and fatherland"); and, as a response to the constitutional struggle, as the defender of democracy in South Africa, under the slogans: "Save the Will of the People. Save Democracy. The National Government Represents the People."

In 1958, the National Party even further simplified its election campaign, and more blatantly than ever before addressed itself exclusively to the Afrikaner section of the electorate. White survival and patriotism were again identified. Mr. Strijdom, Malan's successor as Prime Minister, thus condemned the United Party's plan for slightly increased African representation in the Senate as "a dagger thrust in the heart of White South Africa", and declared, "Nobody who loves South Africa may commit treachery of this kind." But the assumption was clear that the real lover of South Africa was the Afrikaner rather than the English-speaking citizen. Senator de Klerk, Minister of Labour, brought into play in typical fashion both the Battle of Blood River¹ and the Anglo-Boer War (or Freedom

1. The battle in which the Trekkers crushingly defeated Dingaan, the Zulu king, the anniversary of which is still celebrated as a public holiday.

War - Vryheidsoorlog - as Afrikaners called it). In Senator de Klerk's view the election represented "the second Battle of Blood River", but later he shifted the basis of comparison and asserted that those who voted against the Government would be guilty of a "greater treachery than the traitors (i.e., of course, among the Boers) in the Second Freedom War". When The Star understandably referred to the Nationalist campaign as beating "the tribal drum", Die Transvaler retorted that indeed the "tribal drum beats for every person who respects his race ... when the National Party beats the tribal drum, it causes a voice to be heard which its people trust - the voice of the good shepherd who knows his own and whom his own know." 1

In speech after speech the theme was hammered home that the National Party was the proper abode for all national-minded (i.e. "true") Afrikaners, and conversely that there was no place for the Afrikaner in the United Party or alternatively that even if there were room for him, it would be no place for him. Afrikaners who were prepared to support the United Party were stigmatised by Mr. Ben Schoeman, Minister of Railways, as those who were prepared to sing "God Save the Queen" and wave the Union Jack.

The appeal to the volk was further reinforced by

1. Die Transvaler, February 18, 1958.

appetising references to the approaching republic. There was not even the narrowest margin of doubt that the National Government would be returned with an increased Parliamentary majority. But the National Party was able to add fervour to their supporters by urging them to turn out in even greater numbers in order to show by their strength the imminence of the republic. "We must get the biggest number of votes", Mr. Schoeman declared, "for that will indicate how far we have advanced on the path to a republic." And other Ministers, including the Prime Minister, spoke in similar fashion.

With Afrikanerdom's Promised Land seemingly in sight, the faithful enthusiastically responded to the call. In terms of seats, the advance was substantial and apparently inexorable. With the S.W.A. seats the Nationalists now held 103 out of 160 seats. The United Party's strength was reduced to 43, though the opposition was augmented by the three Natives' Representatives and the four Coloured Representatives.¹ In all, then, the Nationalists for the first time enjoyed a two-thirds majority in the House of Assembly. But in this election it was votes that counted; and in this regard the Nationalist

1. With the validation in 1956 of the Separate Representation of Voters Act the Coloured voters in the Cape were placed on a separate roll and divided into four constituencies. Only Whites, however, could be candidates. The election of the Natives' and Coloureds' Representatives was held separately. In 1960 the system of Natives' Representatives was abolished.

aim was still not realised. In the contested seats, it is true, the Nationalists polled 55.1% of the votes, giving them a plurality of 133,546 votes. But in 24 seats, United Party candidates were returned unopposed. If allowance is made for these seats, the Nationalists probably still had the support of no more than 48.5% of the voters. But they were now within striking distance of an overall majority. They were certainly already in a position of undisputed power.

At this stage it is necessary to pause and re-assess the three major historic missions of the National Party as it sees them. These are: firstly, to give the Afrikaner his "due" in South African society at large and in the State in particular; secondly, to lead the nation towards its goal of an "independent" republic; and, thirdly, to "preserve" White civilisation (or the White "race") from being swamped by the rising Black tide. As to the first, interpretations have varied. For Hertzog, as we have seen, this implied what may broadly be described as the principle of parity. He himself described it as the "two-stream" doctrine. In his view, before a truly national (in the sense of "South African") outlook could develop, each of the white groups should be placed on a footing of equality, and regard each other as equal partners. Each section, then, should be encouraged to develop its own culture to the fullest extent, but at the same time led to understand and respect the culture of the other. To this end Hertzog

insisted on the fullest practical recognition of the principle of bilingualism: in the schools, in the public service, in official documents, in the defence and police forces. This policy has been pursued further by subsequent Nationalist governments. To the English-speaking section, indeed, it reached the point in about 1950 where it appeared to be transformed into a policy of deliberate Afrikanerization of the State system. This raises the question of what is the Afrikaner's "due"? It is equality or is it dominance? After all, the Afrikaners form the majority of the White population. Does not this entitle them to a larger share of the cake? There have been indications that the Nationalists have shifted to this point of view, and that they have come to regard the English-speaking section simply as a minority with all that that implies.

The second object of Afrikaner nationalism was finally achieved with the declaration of the republic on May 31, 1961, fifty-one years after the birth of Union. Hertzog had paved the way with the influence he brought to bear firstly on the need to recognize the principle of Dominion equality that gained expression in the Balfour Declaration of 1926, and then on the need to give legislative effect to that principle. This was done by the Statute of Westminster, 1931, and was followed, in the Union, by the passing of the Status of the Union Act, 1934, and the Royal Executive Functions and Seals Act, 1934.

At that, Hertzog was satisfied. South Africa had achieved her independence. The end of the road had been reached. Admittedly under pressure from Smuts and for the sake of Fusion, Hertzog still publicly announced in 1934 that while he himself still favoured a republic, and while members of the new party would be at liberty to advocate it, the Party itself would stand for the maintenance of the existing constitutional position.¹ Many former Nationalists found this a bitter pill to swallow, but swallow it they did for the sake of Fusion and "racial peace", as they called it. Some, however, refused to accept it and these formed with Malan the "purified" Nationalists. Their policy stood unequivocally for a republic outside the British Commonwealth. Their stand, in this view, was justified by the events of September 4, 1939, when by a majority of thirteen, the House rejected Hertzog's motion in favour of neutrality. Here was proof sufficient that as long as South Africa stopped short of its final constitutional goal, it would continue to be "forced" to join in "Britain's" wars. There could be no full independence short of being a republic. Especially from Fusion until 1939 the republican ideal had been one of the main reasons for the continuance in existence of the "purified" National Party. From September 1939 republicanism almost passed from reason to fanaticism. Certainly the National Party would not rest until its goal

1. Alan Paton, op. cit., p. 203.

was achieved. From 1948 it was merely a question of when that would be. Many of the more impatient Nationalists expected it almost at once. But, in spite of Malan's apparent disregard of constitutional form during the constitutional crisis, he still retained a respect for legalism. The programme of the National Party thus laid down "the broad basis of the national will" as a prerequisite to the declaration of the republic. In 1948 and still in 1953 this was clearly lacking; and although the Government had the effective power to impose its will, it preferred to wait. When Dr. Verwoerd became Prime Minister, however, a new urgency in the approach to the republic became apparent.

The third mission, essential to all others, was the preservation of White civilization. This is a mission with a history of almost three hundred years. Indeed so ingrained is it in the Afrikaner consciousness - or sub-conscious - that it is a matter of wonder that so many Afrikaners have been able to liberate their minds from its hold. Yet within the Afrikaner nation these still comprise a tiny minority. To the overwhelming mass of Afrikaners¹ it has always been axiomatic that the Black man must be "kept in his place". This attitude has not been incompatible with a certain

1. And, with less reason from the historical point of view, the great mass of English-speaking people.

benevolent paternalism - "Christian trusteeship" as it is sometimes referred to - as long as it does not conflict too patently with White interests. It is in this spirit that under successive Nationalist regimes, land has been bought for African development ("native Trust Lands"), new agricultural methods promoted, schools, even Universities, built, hospitals and virtually free medical treatment provided, hundreds of thousands of houses built with government subsidies. But all these and other institutions must be separate; and, since the passing of the Group Areas Act, in their own designated areas. And they are, unfortunately, counterbalanced by measures that control the influx of Africans to urban areas, that restrict their opportunities for seeking employment (partly in order to ensure an adequate supply of labour for White farmers), that define occupations according to the racial group that may be employed, that make it illegal for Africans either to form trade unions or to strike.

Until 1948 the ruling doctrine in the area of race relations had been Hertzog's doctrine of segregation. This doctrine he had brought with him after Fusion into the United Party; indeed, it represented already the line of thought of most of the members of the old South African Party. Under Malan, although the name changed to apartheid, the policy was essentially retained although it was applied more restrictively

while at the same time it was given a more positive theoretical interpretation. Malan, however, firmly dismissed as chimerical any idea of total separation. Strijdom, the hero of the Transvaal and no intellectual, stood no nonsense. He simply defined Nationalist policy as one of baasskap - domination - and he did so bluntly and unequivocally. Under Dr. Verwoerd, however, the National Government has taken a leap into the dark almost as spectacular as the original "leap" that gave rise to the expression. For Dr. Verwoerd has translated apartheid as "separate development", and, moreover, giving the concept a territorial base, has proclaimed the promise of "Bantustans". This still falls short of total territorial partition,¹ but it still represents a revolutionary advance in Nationalist thought. According to this concept, each of the eight major African, tribal, or more accurately, linguistic groups will have its own "homeland" in which it will develop politically to the point of independence. Each of these areas will, then, become completely self-governing, independent units, although (the proviso is not always included) associated with each other and with "White" South Africa in a South African Commonwealth. Migrant members of a group

1. My own inclination is to think that Verwoerd nevertheless has total partition in mind as a possible "last resort" and that his policies are designed to facilitate this should the necessity ultimately arise.

(and by definition all urban-dwellers are migrant) will exercise political rights in their own homeland¹ and will still have no political rights in the White area in which they work and reside. Local self-government will, however, be developed in the African townships in these areas. Similarly, Whites residing in a Bantustan, although they may continue to vote for members of their own "White" Parliament, will have no voting rights in the Bantustan in which they reside.

Quite how seriously intended this Grand Design is, it is difficult to say; but it is almost certain that the Transvaal Afrikaner farmer, for example, has a very different idea of what it implies from that held by Dr. Verwoerd. Most probably, the bulk of Afrikaner voters simply put their trust in Verwoerd's granite-like attitudes towards all forms of race-mixing, and believe, all the United Party propaganda to the contrary notwithstanding, that he will not "sell out" the White man's future to the Blacks.²

Mr. Strijdom died a few months after the 1958 general election. It took two ballots before Dr. Verwoerd was elected

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1. A substantial portion of the Transkei electorate lives in the Witwatersrand.
 2. Both in 1961 and again in 1966 Afrikaans-based parties were formed to contest seats on a "Back to Strijdom" policy, but without any success.

by the Parliamentary caucus of the National Party to be his successor;¹ and, in particular, there was talk of dissatisfaction among Cape Nationalists at the growing predominance of the Transvaal section. The course of events, and his own skill at exploiting them to his own advantage, have, however, consolidated Verwoerd's position; so that he has come to enjoy a position of personal pre-eminence that recalls Hertzog and Smuts at their height. There are four main areas in which this success has been achieved. In the first instance one recalls the considerable African unrest from February through to April of 1960, during which time occurred the Sharpeville and Langa demonstrations and shootings,² and massive demonstrations and protest marches in most of the major urban areas. The country was in a state of turmoil and it seemed that some form of coalition was likely. Verwoerd's firmness, however, both ruled coalition out and put an end to the demonstrations. And by doing so, he earned the increased confidence of his own people in him.

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1. In the first ballot the voting was: Verwoerd 80, Dönges 52, Swart 41. Swart was then withdrawn, and in the second ballot the voting was: Verwoerd 98, Dönges 75. It is perhaps significant that Dr. Dönges did not withdraw voluntarily after the first ballot, but pushed the issue to second vote.
 2. 83 non-Whites were reported as having been killed and 365 injured, while 3 African policemen were killed and 33 White and 26 non-White policemen were injured.

Overlapping this period in time there was secondly the attempted assassination of Dr. Verwoerd. His survival and recovery evoked a true Calvinist fervour among Nationalists. Die Burger stated, "In this miraculous escape all believers will see the hand of God himself",¹ and Die Transvaler, somewhat more pontifically assured its readers, "... He who disposes over life and death ordained that the attack should fail."² The idea that God had called Dr. Verwoerd to a special mission in South Africa and that God had saved him in order to complete that mission was dwelt upon to the point that any opposition to Verwoerd might almost be made to appear blasphemous.

Thirdly, Dr. Verwoerd at last led his people to their Promised Land, the Republic. In January 1960, he announced that a referendum would be held, although without specifying the date for it. A Bill to provide for holding the referendum was introduced in Parliament on March 11, and duly passed. Finally in August, the Prime Minister announced that it would be held on October 5. The Transvaal Secretary of the National Party has since stated that the decision to hold the referendum was the Prime Minister's own decision, taken against the advice of party officials, whose preliminary survey estimated an adverse vote of some 20,000 votes. If this was

1. 11 April, 1960.

2. 12 April, 1960.

so, the Prime Minister's gamble paid off. Certain steps were taken to reduce the extent of the gamble: the minimum age qualification for White voters had already¹ been reduced to eighteen, but now it was decided to exclude Coloured voters from the referendum, and, after an initial statement to the contrary, to include the voters of South West Africa. Outside events also helped, notably the Congo atrocities that followed on the Belgian withdrawal. Refugees streamed into South Africa, and the South African press was filled with their stories. Added to the disturbances that took place in South Africa itself, the effect was to increase the sense of loyalty to the Government.

Under these circumstances, too, the Government's plea for White unity was likely to strike a more responsive note. It had been the contention of both Malan and Strijdom before him that only with the establishment of a republic could the two White sections be brought together in full national unity. This conviction was fully shared by Verwoerd and it formed the main plank of the Nationalist's referendum campaign. Two short years after the most blatantly sectional electoral campaign run by any South African party while in office, the call now went out for harmony and co-operation. The Prime Minister appealed to English-speaking voters "to do what the

1. In 1959.

Afrikaans section is prepared to do, namely to create a republic on lines acceptable to all according to the process of give and take." The specially convened Union Congress of the National Party spoke of the grave need for the unification of English-speaking and Afrikaans-speaking people in one nation, and passed the following resolution:

The Union Congress of the National Party extends the hand of friendship to all republicans outside its ranks and particularly to the English-speaking supporters of a republic who are not members of the National Party. They are assured that their support will appear as the greatest contribution to national unity.¹

To smooth the way for this support, the Nationalists made concessions. In the first place they pledged themselves to seek continued membership in the Commonwealth, and in the second place, they agreed that under the republican constitution the only substantial change would be the substitution of a President for the Queen.

The referendum produced a republican majority of 74,580 votes out of 1,634,240 votes cast in a 90.4% poll. Did this represent "the broad basis of the national will"? The relatively slender majority, the fact that the Cape was almost evenly divided,¹ and the fact that Natal was overwhelmingly

1. Volksblad, 31 August, 1960.

2. There was a pro-republic majority of only 1,634 votes.

against the republic,¹ all suggested that it was not. Dr. Verwoerd himself has stated that not even Strijdom would have agreed to it;² but he himself had announced that even a majority of one would be sufficient.

The next step was to seek South Africa's continued membership in the Commonwealth. To that end Dr. Verwoerd went to the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in March 1961, and, wisely, or not, consented to the discussion of South Africa's racial policies. Finally, when agreement on a communiqué had virtually been reached which would have accepted South Africa's application while condemning her policies, a fresh outburst against those policies prompted Dr. Verwoerd to withdraw his application and so take South Africa out of the Commonwealth. There were those liberal-minded persons both inside and outside South Africa who hailed this outcome as a resounding defeat for Dr. Verwoerd, and as marking the beginning of the downfall of the Nationalist regime and all it stood for. They could not have been more completely

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1. In a 92.5% poll the Natal voters rejected a republic by a majority of 93,299 votes.
 2. The Star, Weekly Air Edition, May 21, 1966.

mistaken.¹ Isolated in a hostile world, the Whites of South Africa defensively drew together. Verwoerd was given a hero's welcome on his return. Before a crowd variously estimated between 40,000 and 60,000, he was accorded a 21-gun salute. That is not to say, however, that the English-speaking section was enthusiastic about the outcome. On the contrary, the immediate response was generally one of dismay; but it soon settled down to a spirit of acceptance. Within months, indeed within weeks, the whole political atmosphere underwent a radical transformation compared with that which had prevailed ever since 1948.

Confirmation of this transformation can be found in the general election held in October 1961. With 70 out of 156 seats (including South West Africa) uncontested, the Nationalists gained a resounding victory, scoring 63.7% of the votes cast. Allowing for uncontested seats, they still had the support of approximately 53.5% of the electorate.

In the recent general election of 1966 the trend

1. J.D.B. Miller, writing in 1958, anticipated the result with far greater accuracy. "Few things" [than South Africa's being forced out of the Commonwealth], he said, "would be more likely to unite White South Africans behind the policy of permanent discrimination against non-Whites ... The other Commonwealth members would no doubt feel morally elevated, but this would not improve matters for black South Africans." The Commonwealth in the World (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 287.

became an avalanche. In the newly constructed House of 166 members (not counting the four Coloured's Representatives), the National Party won 126 seats, the United Party 39, and the Progressives retained their only seat. Nineteen seats were uncontested, but in the contested seats the Nationalists gained 58.6% of the votes. An apparently reliable estimate for the uncontested seats gives the National Party a probable 60% of the total voters.¹

In a broadcast message to the nation after the referendum, Dr. Verwoerd said: "It is my keen desire and firm object to try to lead our nation in such a way that without sacrificing or compromising on principles, either the one party or the other, we need never again feel like two nations in one state."² There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of these words. If the general political situation, especially South Africa's position with respect to the outside world, is such as to bring the English-speaking section into closer support for the Government, at the same time the Government is more aware of the need for that support. At the same time, Dr. Verwoerd gave due

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1. Based on the figures in Edgar Bernstein, "The General Election Reappraised," in The Star, Weekly Air Edition, 16 April, 1966. I have left out of account Bernstein's far more dubious attempt to allocate non-voters to the National Party and the Opposition respectively.
 2. Press Digest, 13 October, 1960, p. 406.

warning that the National Party would not "sacrifice or compromise on" its principles. It wants English-speaking support on its own terms, and it appears to be getting it at last.

2. South African and The United Parties

a. The South African Party.

The United Party is accused by its critics on both wings of all manner of weaknesses, but most commonly of "me too-ism", and of speaking with two voices - one in the rural platteland and another in the urban, mainly English-speaking areas. By the Nationalists it has been accused of jingoism, of putting Imperial or, later, Commonwealth interests before South Africa's, of neglecting the aims and interests of Afrikaners, of being the tool of capitalists - mostly Jewish, and of favouring a policy of racial integration that would lead to the bastardisation of the White races and the consequent destruction of White civilisation. By its critics on the other flank it is accused of lacking in moral fibre, of placing expediency before principle, of trying to outbid the Nationalists in their appeal to race prejudice, and of being more conservative on racial matters than the National Party itself.

The fundamental point of distinction, however, between the United Party and the other main political parties is that they might be said to be consensus-forming parties, where the United Party is a consensus-finding party. In other words, the National Party, the Progressive Party, the Liberal Party each has its distinctive programme for South Africa which it advocates and for which it hopes to find support.

The United Party, on the other hand, tries to discover the broadest consensus among the diversity of White opinion and to formulate a programme that will as far as possible embody that consensus.¹ This approach may be described by the disapproving as "weather-vane" politics or in some other opprobrious terms, but it may also be regarded as a perfectly respectable attempt to act in accordance with voter preferences, or as an example of traditional British pragmatism in politics.

Whether it is regarded as reprehensible or as commendable, it represents an approach that is firmly embedded in the Party's past, going back, indeed, to the old South African Party and the tradition of Botha and Smuts. With the bitterness of the Anglo-Boer still in recent memory, their single over-riding object was conciliation. This was, however, no easy task. The English-speaking section too often allowed their "patriotic" (in the English rather than South African connotation) sentiments that were stimulated by their victory in the Anglo-Boer War to show in speech and behaviour. The Afrikaners for their part were hypersensitive to signs of this kind and tended to react with resentment. The outbreak of the First-World War made matters worse. The enthusiasm

1. There is, of course, an element of consensus-seeking in the other parties, but on a less generalised level: the National Party seeks especially to express the consensus it finds in Afrikanerdom, although even there it recognises a leading function as well; the Progressive Party, at least in part, has adapted its liberal aims to the attitudes of the White electorate with which it has to operate; and the Liberal Party seeks to find a consensus between liberal Whites and moderate non-Whites. For all these parties however there is a sense in which it is true to say that their programmes are more important to them than the amount of support they receive.

and fervour of the English-speaking section at the one extreme confronted the 1914 Boer Rebellion and the attitudes that it expressed at the other. And the Unionist Party (on the English side) and National Party (on the Afrikaner side) respectively sought to capitalise on these antipathies and thus tended to widen, or at least perpetuate, the gulf between the two sections of the White population. Amid these troubles, Botha and Smuts did their best to appeal to the sense of need of the one section for the other and to establish the habit and desire to work together.

In the first general election for the Union Parliament their efforts met with gratifying success. Out of a House of 121 members, they gained 66, their nearest rivals being the Unionists who returned 38 members predominantly from English-speaking urban constituencies. With the advantage of hindsight one can see, however, that the split with Hertzog at the end of 1912 spelt the doom of the old South African Party. As early as 1915 it was reduced to a minority position. Its own seats fell to 54 while the new National Party claimed 27. The Unionists did better with 40 seats; and Labour (3) and independents (6) made up the balance. By 1920 the alarming decline in the Party's fortunes was clear for all to see. Not only did it lose a further 13 seats, dropping to a mere 41, but the National Party outstripped it to win 43 seats and the Labour Party, representing the discontent of the

urban workers, reduced the Unionist representation to 25 seats while it rose to 21. Power in the new House could not have been more delicately balanced.

These were the circumstances in which the possibility of reunion (hereniging) was first raised - the reunion of Afrikanerdom whose continued divisions still distressed Afrikaners of various political leanings, including the young Jan Hofmeyr. Smuts himself appears to have been unmoved by this sentiment. His biographer, F.S. Crafford, states that he "feared a united Afrikaner front", and suggests that this was because he would lose his position and power in a united Afrikaner party. This judgement may well do Smuts an injustice. In the present writer's opinion it is more probable that Smuts would do almost anything in order to prevent an outright confrontation between parties based respectively on the two White language groups, and in order to keep them talking together within the fold of a comprehensive party. His patience in the face of many humiliations while serving as Deputy Prime Minister in Hertzog's Fusion government when he was not even admitted as one of Hertzog's inner circle provides ample support for this view. If in 1921 he preferred, in his dilemma, to turn to the English-speaking Unionist Party, it was not because, as his critics alleged, he preferred working with the English to working with the Afrikaners, it was rather because he feared that an Afrikaner party would be captured by the

extremist elements - with a consequent insistence on the creation of a republic and secession from the Commonwealth, neglectful of the cost of alienating the English-speaking section. Then, too, and not least, Smuts had himself a positive belief in the values of the British Commonwealth and its role in the world, and the way he played the game of politics in South Africa was largely conditioned by that belief.

Smuts, then, paused at the idea of hereniging, but in a unique episode in the Union's history, the rank and file Afrikaners, members of both the South African and National Parties, moved in where their leaders hesitated. These devotees of Afrikaner unity met in Bloemfontein at the Hereniging Congress in September 1920, presumably to impel their leaders in that direction. In the end, however, they themselves found the secession issue beyond the reach of agreement or compromise, and the movement broke down. Smuts responded with an attack on the Nationalists that prepared the way for the merger of the South African and Unionist Parties:

Now that the Nationalist party is firmly resolved to continue the propaganda of fanning the fires of secession and of driving the European races apart from each other, the moderate elements of our population¹ have no other alternative than to draw closer to one another in order to fight that policy. A new appeal must, therefore, be

1. I.e. White population.

made to all right-minded South Africans, irrespective of party or race,¹ to join the new party which will be strong enough to safeguard the permanent interests of the Union against the disruptive and destructive policy of the Nationalists.²

The merger between the two parties was effected, but the name of the South African Party was retained. And with this accomplished, Smuts went to the country once more. The results were cheering. The enlarged South African Party won 77 seats, nine more than the combined total of the two former parties in the old Parliament. If this gain was exclusively at the expense of the Labour Party, nevertheless the Nationalists gained only one more seat in spite of their campaign of vilification against Smuts. But there was a cost that had to be paid, and that was the increased bitterness and intransigence of the nationalist core of Afrikanerdom.

The end of the new Smuts government came earlier than perhaps could have been foreseen. In part it was a result of a growing Afrikaner solidarity in opposition to the Unionist element in the government, in part it was due to the discontent associated with the economic depression, that was felt most heavily by the poorer rural element (almost wholly Afrikaner) and the lower ranks of the urban working-class. The latter, however, were propelled into the most

1. Again, he tacitly confines his appeal to the White "races".

2. Quoted by Crafford, op.cit., pp. 196-197.

hostile opposition to Smuts by his ruthless handling of the 1922 Rand riots - or incipient revolution - that broke out in the wake of a general strike of miners. It is a wonder that Labour ever forgave him. The immediate result was to drive the Labour Party into a firm alliance with the Nationalists. Both parties fulminated against Smuts's alleged enslavement to the capitalists, an attack that was given an anti-Semitic bias by the Nationalists, and an anti-Black bias by Labour, because of their fear of being supplanted by cheaper Black labour.

The result of all this was that in the 1924 elections the South African Party lost 23 seats, falling to a mere 54. The National Party, on the other hand, picked up nineteen seats to gain a total of 63, and the Labour Party increased its strength from 10 to 17 seats. Once again, no party had a clear majority; but this time the National and Labour Parties were in firm alliance. Thus Hertzog for the first time became Prime Minister, a position that he was to hold for an unbroken period of fifteen years.

The South African Party was now, also for the first time, after fourteen years in office, thrust into the role of opposition. But at least there was this comfort: the government ranks as well as the opposition ranks comprised Afrikaners and English-speaking members sitting side by side.

Smuts' nightmare of a consolidated phalanx of Afrikaners facing across the floor of the House a consolidated phalanx of English-speakers had still not eventuated.

The success of the National Party at the elections of 1924 and Hertzog's "triumph" at the 1926 Imperial Conference enthused Afrikanerdom and placed the South African Party on the defensive. And in 1929 Hertzog gained even greater success. The National Party captured a further fourteen seats, thus giving it an absolute majority, and if the South African Party won back seven seats, these gains were at the expense of the Labour Party, not the Nationalists,¹ and still left it in a relatively weak position.

b. The United Party

It was the economic crisis that came to the rescue of the South African Party as it had earlier to its opponents. In particular the Hertzog-Havenga policy of clinging to the gold standard in order to demonstrate the country's economic independence was more and more clearly bringing economic ruin. Moreover, there were Afrikaners who still yearned for nothing more than they did for hereniging. With Nationalist losses in by-elections and Tielman Roos's coalition campaign to act as catalysts, the two leaders were eventually brought together and reached the coalition

1. In 1929 there were thirteen more seats than in 1924.

agreement that brought triumph in the 1933 elections. To complete the work, the two parties finally took the historic step and abandoned their former identities in order to create a single new party: the United National South African Party, in short, the United Party.

The new party, in numerical terms, possessed overwhelming strength. It mustered 117 members in the House as against the 19 "purified" Nationalists under Malan and four Dominion Party members under Colonel Stallard who had refused to follow the South African Party into Fusion. In the interests of unity, Smuts agreed that Hertzog should be Prime Minister while he himself accepted the subordinate position of Deputy Prime Minister.

The five years of the United Party's glory, its first five years, at the same time demonstrated most clearly its weaknesses. Was the Party ever more, in those days, than a papered up agreement, kept in reasonable repair by constant negotiation between its two leaders and by their patience in smoothing the ruffled feelings of their respective wings? Within itself, on fundamental issues of grave importance, it differed widely: South Africa should/should not become a republic; it had/had not the right to secede from the Commonwealth; in the event of war it had/had not the right to remain neutral; Jewish immigration should/should not be discouraged; anti-Asiatic laws were/were not urgently

necessary - the areas of disagreement could be extended to cover almost the whole range of public affairs. Crafford, drawing on the comments of the leading Pietermaritzburg newspaper, thus portrays its predicament:

Somewhat unreasonably under the circumstances, for a British newspaper, but with a rude pertinence, the Natal Witness inquired of what use unity was between leaders and groups that were compelled to maintain it by means of an agreement to differ from each other on almost every problem. And of what value to the nation's welfare, if, for the sake of unity, fundamental principles were subordinated to superficial compromises.

Indeed by the very nature of its composition and that of its motley following, the Government was constitutionally incapable of facing up to¹ some of the country's most pressing problems.

And all the while, Malan and his gesuiwerdes were waiting ready to exploit every possibility of division: on racial issues - such as their proposals to ban mixed marriages, to prohibit the employment of White women by Asians, to establish compulsory separation of residential areas, to limit certain occupations to Whites - to force the liberal element, particularly Hofmeyr, and the conservative element of the Party into conflict; or on constitutional issues - the republican question, secession, the anthem, neutrality - to set loyalists and republicans against each other. It was certainly no easy thing, under the circumstances, to keep the Party intact. It was during this period, but after he himself had resigned

1. Op.cit., p. 278.

from the Cabinet, that Hofmeyr wrote in a private letter:

I am sorry for Smuts. He has been sorely humiliated. To a large extent it is his own fault. He is really no match for the Prime Minister in simple directness and straightforwardness of purpose. He is now Hertzog's prisoner in the Cabinet. He must do whatever he is told to do. His only possible escape is through the outbreak of war and the ¹ almost inevitable Cabinet split which will result.

That Smuts suffered humiliation, and frustration too, was certainly true; but Hofmeyr over-dramatized the position perhaps in describing Smuts as "Hertzog's prisoner in the Cabinet". Yet there was a measure of truth in what he said. As Paton argues, "Smuts was willing to endure almost anything ² to avoid a break in the party." Hertzog no doubt realized this; so in large measure it was Hertzog who made the running, and Smuts who had to "endure" and try to keep his followers within the fold. The last sentence of the quotation from Hofmeyr probably had this measure of truth in it, too, viz. that Smuts seemed to consider the issue of war and peace the only issue vital enough to gain priority over party unity.

In the event, it was that issue that broke the unity of the Cabinet and of the party, too. The test came all too soon after the United Party's only electoral contest with Hertzog as its leader: the general election of 1938. That has been a triumph. True, the Purified Nationalists increased their strength to 27 and Hertzog's own majority fell substantially; true, too, at the other end of the spectrum, the

1. Quoted by Alan Paton, op.cit., p. 291.

2. Ibid., p. 281.

Dominion Party increased its strength to eight, capturing all the Durban seats on its way; but with 111 members returned under its banner, the United Party was clearly impregnable - as long as it held together. The West's surrender of Czechoslovakia to Hitler postponed the United Party crisis.¹ But it was only a postponement. When war broke out Hertzog and five of his ministers were faced by the refusal of Smuts and six of his colleagues to accept Hertzog's "qualified" neutrality proposal. When the issue was taken to the House, Hertzog, as we have already seen, was defeated by a small majority, and Smuts came back at last as Prime Minister. But Fusion was dead. The United Party virtually reverted to the old South African Party in all but name, and Afrikanerdom entered into the last phase of its struggle for political unity.

For the while, however, Smuts managed to retain the loyalty of sufficient Afrikaners to the United Party to prevent the total racial split he dreaded so much. With the aid of the Dominion and Labour Parties, both of whom he admitted into a coalition government, and with the support of the three Native's Representatives, he retained a small but safe majority in the House. In this fashion, harassed,

1. Apparently Smuts would have been prepared to remain neutral in a war over Czechoslovakia, but whether his English-speaking supporters would have accepted the position is another matter. Cf. Crafford, op.cit., p. 280.

but not really threatened, he was able to see out the full term of Parliament. Finally in July 1943 Smuts's leadership was put to the test of a general election. The main issue, inevitably, was the war issue; but the old colour questions were also well to the fore, while in Natal coalition candidates vied with each other in support of more restrictive action against Indian "penetration".

With the Nationalist forces divided, it came as no surprise when Smuts gained a smashing triumph. The United Party gained seventeen more seats, to reach a total of 89, the Dominion Party's total dropped from eight to seven, but the seat that was lost went to its coalition partner, the Labour Party, which increased its representation from four to nine, and two Government-supporting independents were also returned. With the three Natives' Representatives, Smuts could count on the support of 110 members, against the 43 Nationalists who were returned. The United Party, it seemed, had returned to the dominance of South African politics that it had enjoyed in 1938. In fact, it was about to begin on its last term of office, although few in 1943, of whatever party, could have been brought to believe that.

It was certainly a difficult term, and the coming of peace, if anything increased the difficulties. There was much discontent among returning soldiers over the

tardiness of their return and over the conditions of demobilisation. Food shortages and rocketing prices, the prohibition on the milling of white flour and the universal dislike of the "sawdust" standard loaf of bread, fumbling and incompetent administration - all took their toll of the government's popularity. But there were, as well, graver problems, and of these none graver or more typical of the difficulties of the United Party than the passing of the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill in 1946. The United Party, even in the former days of its might under Herzog, had been under considerable pressure to restrict Indian residential areas. Smuts in 1943, harassed as well by his Dominionite supports, had felt it necessary to pass the Pegging Act that enforced the status quo. But anti-Indian feeling is one of the most intense as well as pervasive of South African prejudices, and it runs highest in predominantly English-speaking Natal. The demands for further action made both by the Nationalists and by the Dominionites found a response too in the sentiments of many members of the United Party. In terms of the party political situation it was becoming clear that some more stringent legislation would have to be enacted. But other forces were at work as well. India was approaching independence, and she made the strongest representations against further anti-Indian legislation. Offense to India, moreover, would clearly have repercussions in the Commonwealth and also in the United Nations. In addition, in his chief

lieutenant and heir-apparent, Jan Hofmeyr, Smuts had one who had always occupied the role of champion of the minorities, both Indians and Jews. Early in 1946 this same Hofmeyr had addressed the convocation of the Witwatersrand University and there he had said, to quote but one sentence: "Surely it is a mockery for us to talk of ourselves as free people, or acclaim ourselves as the inheritors of a tradition of freedom, while we are as a nation to so large an extent the slaves of prejudice..."¹

It was because of this opposition of forces that, typically, the United Party attempted to balance both sides in its Bills. So, on the one hand, it imposed a much stricter system of segregation on the Indians, while on the other hand it extended to them a limited right of representation in Parliament and in the Natal Provincial Council. The result was to put the Nationalists and most of White Natal into an uproar over the extension of voting rights to Indians, and to put the Indians into an uproar over the segregation clauses in the Act. The Indians not only refused to accept the system of representation given to them, but proceeded to engage in a dramatic Civil Disobedience campaign. India herself imposed a ban on the export of jute to South Africa, severed her diplomatic relations, and secured at least a verbal victory over Smuts at the United Nations. These

1. Quoted in Paton, op.cit., p. 422.

signs of the rising power and influence of the new Asian power reacted strongly on the conservative elements in South African White society - that is, on the great majority.

The United Party was, then, placed on the defensive with respect to its economic, agricultural and marketing policies, and also with respect to its racial policies. The old successful cry to save White South Africa from Black domination aided and abetted by Communism was taken up once more by the Nationalists. And while Hofmeyr and the handful who thought like him responded by trying to attack the fortress of prejudice, other United Party members were busy trying to convince their constituents that its fortress was in better shape than that of the Nationalists.

Most observers believed that the United Party had more than enough strength in reserve to carry it successfully through the election. Events proved otherwise. The United Party's strength plunged to 65 seats while its electoral ally, the Labour Party won six. But the H.N.P.-Afrikaner Party alliance gained a total of 79 seats, and therefore the right to form the Cabinet. The United Party was stricken, but the Nationalists' boast that they would hold power for twenty years was still dismissed lightheartedly. But before the next election came the United Party suffered two more grievous blows: first the death of Hofmeyr, its own as

well as the nation's conscience,¹ and then the death of Smuts, the Party's contact with greatness. Its subsequent leaders, first J.G.N. Strauss and later Sir de Villiers Graaff have been able men, and the latter particularly has all the attributes that would normally mark a man for political success, but they have lacked not only the conscience of Hofmeyr and the greatness of Smuts, but the firmness and strength of a Malan or a Verwoerd.

Since its defeat in 1948 the United Party's strength has dwindled, slowly but steadily, at each succeeding election. In company with the Torch Commando and the Labour Party, it put forth its greatest effort in the general election of 1953. It had been accused in 1948 not only of complacency but of slipshod management of the campaign. In 1953 there was tremendous enthusiasm and superb organisation, and, in the Government's attempts to manipulate the constitution it had a clear-cut, decisive issue on which to fight. And it made the most of the issue. A quotation taken from one of its election pamphlets² is typical of its approach:

Cold-bloodedly and without shame, the Nationalist Government, seeking means to keep itself in power, tried to violate our Constitution ... The Nationalist leaders were thwarted - but they will try again if they get the chance.

They must not be given the chance.

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1. According to Paton, Smuts said after Hofmeyr's death, "Now that Hofmeyr is dead, South Africa will not have a conscience." Op.cit., p. 530. The prophecy has proved largely true of the leadership both of the United Party and of the country.
 2. The Law of our Fathers (United Party Head Office, Johannesburg).

The Party's election slogan was "Vote for the right to vote again." In general, then, the Party stood for constitutionalism, and for the preservation of democratic freedoms; and on racial issues it sought to demonstrate not only the impracticability of apartheid but also its tendency to produce tension rather than to ease it.

In spite of its best efforts, however, the strength in the House of the United and Labour Parties combined fell to a discouraging 61. The 1953 election demonstrated beyond any doubt that may have been stirred by the closeness of the 1948 election that the United Party faced the immense electoral hurdles, not only of an unfavourable distribution of its voting strength, and it would seem, of hostile delimitation commissions, but, more fundamentally, a solidity of Afrikaner nationalism that embraced something like 80% of the Afrikaners, combined with a vehement racial conservatism vis-à-vis the non-White peoples of South Africa. If ever the United Party is to return to power under the present representative system, it has to win votes from these Afrikaners. That was the lesson of 1953; and the task of its leadership has been to maintain its opposition to the Government while at the same time to avoid alienating the more "moderate", but still thoroughly conservative, section of the Afrikaners.

In its balancing trick, it has lost on both wings. In 1954 seven of its members split off to form the short-lived Conservative Party. In 1959, largely under the influence of Mr. Douglas Mitchell, the United Party leader in Natal, it shed more of its members who left to form the Progressive Party. In 1958 it campaigned almost entirely on its old plank of national unity and on economic issues, and evaded, as far as it could, the awkward subject of non-White policies. In the 1960 referendum campaign, again, it did not oppose a republic as such. It campaigned, rather, against a Verwoerd Republic or a Broederbond Republic, against "the wrong republic at the wrong time", and against the needless exposure of the country to the risk of losing her Commonwealth membership. Since 1960, its main attack, both in 1961 and again in 1966, has been its charge that the Government's apartheid policy envisages the dismemberment of South Africa and runs the risk of creating hostile African states within the borders of South Africa. On the whole, its opposition to the territorial aspects of apartheid has been well argued, both on economic and on political grounds. It is not improbable that more voters share the United Party's misgivings over these matters than voting returns reveal. But the United Party's own alternative has, in its turn, been the subject of scathing criticism both from the National Party and the Progressives.

The United Party sums up its policy devised in 1960 under the title of Race Federation. The following extracts from its policy statement Race Policies issued in February 1965, provide some insight into United Party race attitudes:

FACT The basic and fundamental fact is that the White population in S.A. is outnumbered by 4 to 1 by the Bantu, the large majority of whom are still in a primitive stage of development.

PHILOSOPHY The philosophy underlying the U.P. approach is that White political leadership and control must be maintained in the interests of all our people, while at the same time all must share in the fruits of our Western civilization.

STRATEGY ----

(1) Political

In the political sphere, we have developed a scheme that will

(a) retain control of the whole country and all its population under a Parliament the majority of whom shall be White;

(b) give a defined share of representation to the non-White peoples in that Parliament, a share that will not be increased except with the consent of the present electorate, and which, having been accepted as fair and equitable in the circumstances, will be defended with all the weapons at our disposal.

In the development of our policy towards a federation of race groups the Reserves have continued to occupy an important place... although it is to be primarily a federation of race groups and not territories, special provision is made for areas predominantly Black such as the Transkei and the other Reserves which will be treated as political units for administrative purposes. Here self-administration for the Bantu will have the opportunity to reach its highest development, and they will have representation in a Central Parliament.

GENERAL

The total number of these representatives from the Reserves and Urban and Rural areas shall be eight, they shall be elected on a separate roll and they shall be drawn from the White group until such time as the present electorate votes in favour of a change.

In social and economic matters, the United Party stands for the liberalisation but not the total abolition of restrictive measures: modification of the pass laws and influx control, a greater flexibility in residential segregation laws, the provision, under certain conditions, for "deserving Bantu" to acquire freehold title to their homes in urban Bantu areas. The United Party is, however, pledged to the abandonment of the system of "job reservation", which defines the racial group which may be employed in stated occupational categories, and its replacement by a system of "the rate for the job".

In general, the Nationalists attack the United Party policy on two grounds: one, that it denies to the African the principle of self-determination which, in their opinion, is allowed for in their own Bantustan concept; two, that it involves the concept of integration, that it will lead to the presence of non-Whites in Parliament and runs the risk of opening the flood gates to Black nationalism. The Progressives agree with the Nationalists that the United Party plan for eight representatives for the Africans in Parliament will be regarded by the Africans as totally

inadequate, and consequently urge acceptance of their own more generous policy for African political participation in government. In short, as is its frequent fate, the United Party falls between two stools.

Until the advent of the Republic in 1961 the United Party, in spite of its difficulties in formulating and in presenting a consistent and coherent policy, still represented a considerable force in South African politics. It was only in the referendum in 1960 that it lost its majority position in terms of popular votes, and then only narrowly. Since 1961, however, its decline has been evident. As is shown in the section on voting trends, the percentage of Afrikaners voting for it would appear to be decreasing, while the defection of English-speaking voters to the Nationalist side which was barely discernible in 1960 has become clearly apparent in the recent 1966 elections. Three major factors operate here, and perhaps one may add a fourth. The first and most important lies in the nature of its former Afrikaner support. Many of these were simple men, honest and of goodwill, men such as Deneys Reitz,¹ who were still under the

1. Deneys Reitz was the son of a former President of the O.F.S. He enlisted while still a boy in the Boer forces and fought to the end under Smuts. After the signing of the Treaty of Vereniging he went in self-imposed exile to live in Madagascar. Mrs. Smuts, however, finally persuaded him to return; he entered politics and became a Cabinet Minister under Smuts. He had two abiding passions: loyalty to Smuts and the belief in a united South Africa. He has told his story in No Outspan and Trekking On.

spell of loyalty to Smuts, the old Boer general, and who, under his influence accepted as South Africa's first priority the building of national unity. In their eyes the Nationalists represented a bitter, disruptive force that impeded their goal. But since the end of the forties this generation has been dying out, and although the tradition they founded still lingers on, it is being replaced by a harder, more assertive generation, the product of unilingual schools and of indoctrination.

Secondly, the advent of the Republic marked, too, the advent of the Nationalists' "wooing" of the English-speaking voter. Having accomplished their primary political goal, the Nationalists were prepared to address themselves to the English-speaking voters in search of votes that would strengthen their position both internally and externally. While the author believes that the National Party is not prepared to jettison any of its essentially Afrikaner goals, it now plays these down to some extent at any rate, and itself publicly champions the cause of national unity.

This appeal by the Nationalists is aided by the third major factor: the change in attitudes of the English-speaking section itself. It would seem now that the two things that held that section to consistent opposition to the Nationalists were: a defensive reaction to the fear that the Nationalists

evoked particularly in their earlier more militant days, that the rights of the English-speaking section were in danger; and an attachment to the Crown and the Commonwealth connection. That connection was irrevocably severed in 1961 and, in spite of the doughty declarations of such men as Douglas Mitchell that Natal would "never accept" the republic,¹ in fact the position has been accepted as irreversible, and on May 31, 1966, in the Republic-wide Festival to mark the fifth anniversary of the Republic, Natal English-speaking schools participated along with the rest, as though it were "their" Republic they were celebrating. This change in attitude is partly no doubt the product of habituation, but it is also and more fundamentally due to another factor: their changed view of the world. The English-speaking South African is in general as conscious as the Afrikaner of the threat of African engulfment. The enormous leap into independence taken by African territories particularly during 1960-1961 has completely changed South Africa's position on the continent. It is now faced, to the North, not with friendly colonial powers, but with militantly hostile African states; and internally it is more than ever aware of the pressures of its own African population.

1. Mr. Mitchell stated in Parliament: "We do not accept the republic in Natal, we reject it and will have no part in it." House of Assembly Debates, 31 January, 1961, vol. 106, col. 453. Cf. p. F 303 below.

Moreover, every atrocity in the Congo, every break-down of law and order, every evidence of corruption, every overture of friendship to one or both of the Communist powers, and every coup and revolution, demonstrates to the South African, English-speaking as well as Afrikaner, that he cannot "afford" to let "that sort of thing" happen in his own country. Meanwhile, Britain's alleged "betrayal" of the White man in Kenya and in the former Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and now the sanctions she has imposed against the Smith regime in Rhodesia, have resulted in a reversal in attitude, so that to-day, even in Natal, Britain is the most disliked state outside of the Communist countries. Finally, the English-speaking section has not as such suffered any deprivation of its legal rights under the Republic. Their fear and suspicion of the Nationalists has largely disappeared, the former attachment to Britain and the Commonwealth no longer operates, and every sign of external pressure and hostility and of internal threat gives reason for drawing closer to the Nationalists.

Finally, one may perhaps add the lack of consistency in United Party speeches, policy and action. Voters find it difficult to pin down precisely what it is that the United Party stands for. For this reason many voters may find a lack of positive inducement to vote for it; and of those who do vote for the United Party, many are probably really voting against the National Party, because they

believe that the Bantustan policy either offers no real solution or is positively dangerous, or because they oppose the more grossly oppressive measures of the Government.

In spite of all this, however, the United Party yet fulfils the functions of an opposition. It still commands substantial support in the electorate, although that support is increasingly becoming restricted in area and becoming more and more identified with the English-speaking section. In Parliament it still subjects the Government to inquiry and criticism, and deploys forces still sufficient in number and ability to mount effective debates, particularly on legal and economic matters. Only infrequently, however, does it launch a full-scale attack on government policies; it tends to choose its ground carefully, even cautiously, and on too many issues it will support a Bill at the second reading, reserving its attack for particular clauses. Yet its position is an uncommonly difficult one. It may often seem timid and vacillating, yet it seeks to retain what influence it has on the Government and the country, and to do that it must present itself as a "responsible" opposition. And meanwhile, too, it waits against the possible day of a split in the ranks of the government; for should that day come it will be the most likely candidate for those seeking a new political home. And if those hopes fail, there still

remains the possibility of a re-alignment of forces similar to that which took place at Fusion, and then the Party would like to be in as strong a bargaining position as possible.

Are these just pipe-dreams? They may well be. It might be that the United Party would serve the future as well as the present better if it were to adopt a policy of more vigorous and direct attack on government policies, based on grounds of morality and justice and not merely on expediency. Unfortunately, however, in the consensus to which it looks for guidance it cannot find a common purpose, a common conception of what tomorrow's South Africa should be like.

3. The Minor Parties¹

a. The Labour Party

The Labour Party of South Africa, established in 1907, displayed in its fifty odd years of active politics a protean character that few parties have rivalled yet alone surpassed. Mainly centred on the English-speaking urban workers, especially on the Reef, it entered into a political alliance with Hertzog's National Party and supported his government from 1924-1933, then in 1939 it supported Smuts against Hertzog and his "purified" successors, and entered into electoral alliances with the United Party in 1943,

1. Each general election in South Africa has invariably produced a rash of minor parties, many of these existing as parties by reason only of their names. Others, however, have attempted to build themselves up as identifiable political parties. Few have succeeded. Of these the only parties that have any real significance or interest are the four treated in this section.

1948 and 1953. Finally it adopted a liberal non-White policy, and suffered virtual extinction in the general election of 1958. In 1961, for the first time since the formation of Union, there was no official Labour Party candidate.

The zig-zags in the history of the Labour Party reflect the dualism in its nature that plagued it until it found the courage to submit to its own political annihilation. Predominantly English-speaking it found its principal target, at least in its early years, in the predominantly English-speaking (although by extraction often Jewish) capitalists - "Rand Lords", as they were often called. And their principal fear, as the Union was hit by the post-World War I depressions, was that in the period of low wages, African workers would move in to take their jobs. This fear was aggravated in 1921 when the Chamber of Mines proposed to admit Africans to employment in semi-skilled categories, and the call to strike went out. The situation rapidly deteriorated while Smuts waited for the strikers to adopt a position that would justify his crushing them, and in the end a group of Communists (of all people!) took up arms under the banner, "Workers of the World, fight and unite for a White South Africa."¹

1. Léo Marquard, The Peoples and Policies of South Africa (Oxford University Press, London, 2nd e.d., 1960), p. 136.

Up to this time the English-speaking population of the Union was divided among three main parties: those who gave first priority to reconciliation with the Dutch, followed Botha, Smuts and Merriman into the South African Party; others, who cherished more firmly the British connection joined together in the Unionist Party, and these included most of the English-speaking capitalists; and finally there was the Labour Party. It was not anti-Afrikaner (or in those times, anti-Dutch), but it distrusted the United and Unionist Parties' connections with capitalism. From the first, therefore, a sense of conflict of class interest prevented the English-speaking section from uniting politically. The Labour Party, in spite of its English-speaking composition, was more aware of the forces that divided it from its compatriots in the South African Party, enlarged now by the inclusion of the Unionists, than it was of the forces that might unite them. Then, too, Hertzog and his Nationalists appeared to stand more firmly for the interests of the Whites than did the South African Party; so that the class interest that divided the Labour Party from the South African Party drew it to the National Party. On top of all that, Smuts's devastating employment of the Defence Force against the 1922 strikers turned him into their most hated enemy.

Under these circumstances, therefore, it was hardly surprising that Labour turned to Hertzog and gave him the support in 1924 that enabled him to form his first ministry. There followed nine years of co-operation with the Nationalists, years that were not always easy. Some Labour supporters left the Party to join with the Nationalists, others to join the United Party after Fusion. Yet the Party was able to preserve its identity and also its representation in Parliament. When the Hertzog-Smuts split occurred in 1939, the Englishness of the Labour Party reasserted itself, however, and it went over to support Smuts in his war motion, and subsequently to join with him in his coalition government.

Meanwhile a more fundamental transformation was gestating within the Party. From 1941, at least, under the leadership of Alex Hepple a movement began which sought to re-examine the Party's colour policies. Still in 1943 Labour Party candidates were able to vie with Dominionite opponents in the Natal seats for the most outspoken expression of anti-Indian prejudice. But in 1946, over the Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Bill, the breaking-point came. The liberalism of Hepple prevailed over the conservatism of Madeley who angrily left the Party. The Party thus purged then engaged in a period of policy formulation that culminated in its famous 1953 statement - "by far the most liberal which had been enunciated by a South African political

party up to that point."¹

With a somewhat passing nod in recognition of its socialist affiliations, it proceeded to champion the cause of non-White workers, even to supporting their admission to existing trade unions. On the political front, in the vital area of representation, it proposed to extend the voting rights to all adult male non-Whites satisfying the Standard VI (Grade 7) qualification or its equivalent, and to accord to the otherwise unrepresented Africans, in addition to their three Cape seats, three further seats in the Transvaal, and two each in Natal and the O.F.S.

The Labour Party's new-found liberalism was not seriously tested in the 1953 elections. For one thing, it was "protected" by its renewed electoral alliance with the United Party; for another thing, all other issues were overshadowed by the constitutional issue. By 1958 these advantages, if advantages they were, no longer operated. The electoral alliance was terminated, the two Labour candidates declaring their refusal to "become the victims of political expediency".² They paid their price; neither was elected; and, in effect, the Party ceased to exist.

1. Carter, op.cit., p. 342.

2. The Star, March 18, 1958.

b. The Union Federal Party

The Federal Party's genealogy may be traced back to the Dominion Party, and before that to the Home Rule Party, and, indeed, back to the opposition that existed in Natal to joining the other three colonies in forming a union. In part, in other words, it represented those English-speaking South Africans, (and in particular Natalians) who still did not fully identify themselves with the rest of the nation; in part it was, too, the party of those whose political obligations were summed up by the concept of loyalty to the Crown; in part it represented a loss of faith in the United Party; in part it represented a genuine concern over the possibilities of abuse of power that its concentration in the hands of the Union government made possible; and in part it offered an alternative for those who wished to promote a more liberal policy towards non-Whites than that offered by the two major parties.

The immediate progenitor of the Federal Party, however, was the Torch Commando. The Torch Commando was an organ of protest that was created in response to the Government's attempts to ignore the provisions of the entrenched clauses of the constitution. In the first instance it was an organisation of ex-servicemen and, although its membership was subsequently broadened, that is what it essentially remained. The Torch Commando brought a fervour and élan

to the 1953 election that the United Party at any rate had hitherto lacked. It organised vast public meetings and impressive protest marches, and with its 100,000 or more members constituted a force that the United Party in the end, although somewhat reluctantly, had to come to terms with. One of the main points at issue between the Torch Commando and the United Party was the latter's attitude to the "Natal Stand".

The "Natal Stand" itself was a complex matter. It was partially expressed in the resolution of the Natal Provincial Council (itself dominated by the United Party) calling for a new National Convention and envisaging the dissolution of the Union if the Constitution were not "honoured both in spirit and in letter".¹ It was more vigorously expressed at a T.C. rally when an estimated 35,000 people roared "No!" to the question "Will you remain in a Broederbond republic if it is declared on the pretext of the volkswil?" With equal fervour they bellowed "Yes" to the further question, "Are you prepared to take the consequences if Natal is forced to stand on her own?"² With

1. For the full text of the resolution see Carter, op.cit., p. 441, n.40, and cf. the later resolution, ibid., n. 46.

2. Carter, op.cit., p. 318.

this kind of backing, the Torch Commando was in a strong position and, despite a United Party national congress resolution rejecting "unilateral action", the United Party was at last compelled to reach a compromise agreement with the Commando.

The negotiations, in which Douglas Mitchell played a leading part, as leader of the United Party in Natal, were soon charged with suspicion and mutual personal antagonism and were later to lead to public recriminations of bad faith. In the meanwhile, however, they produced a text on the basis of which the United Democratic Front, consisting of the Torch Commando, the Labour Party and the United Party, could be formed to fight the 1953 election.

Once the election was over and the Front had been defeated, the Commando reconsidered its position. As an organ of protest it had done its uttermost and it had failed. But in the process it not only continued in its conviction that the Government's actions and policies were ruinous, it also formed the conviction that the United Party was the tool of "professional politicians",¹ hesitant with respect to the "Natal Stand", and timid and equivocal with respect to non-White policies. The Torch Commando itself, however, was divided. United in opposition, it lacked the unity of purpose to formulate fully articulated positive policies,

1. A common pejorative term in T.C. circles.

and, indeed, the will or the desire to form itself into a rival opposition party. Under the circumstances it took the only possible course and disbanded itself.

Some Torch Commando members returned (if they had ever left) to the United Party fold; some remained unaffiliated to any political party; some joined in the formation of the Liberal Party; but, especially in Natal, a very considerable number continued their association by forming the Federal Party. The Federal Party, however, extended beyond the members of the former Torch Commando. Certainly it benefited from the experience of former Torch leaders and organisers, but even in leadership it went outside the ranks of the Commando. The Leader of the Federal Party, indeed, was Heaton Nicholls, one of Natal's elder statesmen, first a member of the South African Party then of the United Party and finally South Africa's High Commissioner in London. While he had been a South African/United Party man, Heaton Nicholls had always been an exponent of the Natal position, particularly in matters of loyalty to the Crown. He it was who nearly sabotaged Smuts's war resolution in Parliament by befriending it for the wrong reason. "This country", he declared, "is at war under our South African constitution, of which the King is a part....the King of this country is the King of Great Britain and the Dominions, one and indivisible... In the eyes of every English-speaking man in this country, South Africa is at war; and it does not

require any vote in this House or any declaration by the Government of this country to determine whether we are at war or not at war."¹

In the attitudes he expressed then, Nicholls in effect was stating the Dominion Party position although he was not a member of it. The Dominion Party had been created in 1934 as a result of the distrust of the English-speaking section of the South African Party of Smuts's motives for going into Fusion. It was Smuts's fate to be suspected by the Malanites of leading the National Party into captivity by the English, and by the English-speaking section of leading the South African Party into captivity by the Afrikaner. The Dominion Party reacted to its fears in much the same way as the "purified" Nationalists reacted to theirs. Some extracts from their Programme of Principles² make clear their position:

This party stands for:

1. (a) The maintenance of the British Empire as a united whole....
- (b) Opposing all movements to resolve the component parts of the Empire into Sovereign States...
- (c) Securing throughout the Empire the status of a British subject...to each and all who owe allegiance to His Majesty the King....
3. The preservation of equal language rights...i.e. the right of every South African, including every Government servant, to use either or both official languages at his option, save in so far as the use of the second language is an essential qualification for the work on which he may be engaged....

1. House of Assembly Debates, vol. 36, 1939, col. 34.

2. Printed in full in D.W. Kruger, South African Parties and Policies, 1910-1960 (Human and Rousseau, Cape Town, 1960), pp. 89-94.

6. (a) No racial discrimination of any kind between citizens of British and of Dutch descent in South Africa, and a fair treatment shall be accorded to all races and classes in the Union.
12. (a) The maintenance of restrictions of Asiatic immigration.
 - (b) Opposition to the further penetration of Asiatics amongst the European and Native population.
 - (c) The encouragement of repatriation of Asiatics.
 - (d) Stricter supervision of Asiatics in commerce and industry, especially in regard to wage determination.
16. (a) The maintenance and extension of the rights and powers of the Provincial Councils...
19. (a) The retention of the Cape Native franchise as provided in the South Africa Act, 1909, until such time as a general and effective policy has been evolved, for the representation of Natives throughout the Union, and subject to prior consultation with the Natives of the Union.

In "Native Policy", the Dominion Party was at least left of centre of the old South African Party and even more so of the new United Party. In "Asiatic" policy, it represented a conservatism that was not far short of that of the "purified" Nationalists. In its conceptions of "loyalty" and of the "British Empire", it probably went even beyond Heaton Nicholls. At the time, however, it must be considered broadly representative of the English-speaking section, at least of Natal; for in 1938 it achieved a clean sweep of all the Durban seats, as well as winning the Pietermaritzburg District and Natal South Coast seats, also in Natal, and the East London City seat in the Cape.

After the 1943 elections the Dominion Party disintegrated, many of its members joining Smuts's United Party (since his "loyalty" had now been proved), some going into retirement, and a small section still clinging to its identity under the ironic new-old name of the South African Party. This party entered eleven candidates in the 1948 election: four in the Cape, two in the Transvaal, and five in Natal. Altogether they polled only 11,894 votes and, thus neglected, sank into obscurity.

It will be seen, however, that when the Federal Party was formed in 1953 there was an existing tradition as well as an immediate excitement on which it could draw. Times, of course, had changed since 1934. Only the most die-hard Colonel Blimp could still talk of the British Empire. The status of South Africa as an independent sovereign state could hardly now be questioned. The divisibility of the Crown, at least since 1949, was now beyond dispute. And if old issues had died, new ones, too, had arisen. The Malan Government of 1953 posed far more urgent problems than had the Hertzog-Smuts Government of 1933-4. The Federal Party, therefore, was not just the old Dominion Party under a new name. A comparison of its principles with those of the Dominion Party is interesting in revealing these differences and thus the changes in attitude of those English-speaking South Africans most conscious of their

British origins. Its programme included:¹

1. To create in South Africa opportunities for people of all races to enjoy fullness of life and liberty under the protection of the law;...
3. To entrench the material elements of the contract of Union and, within that framework, to reshape the present quasi-Unitary system to one of Federal Union by redistribution of powers from the Central to Provincial Governments, giving a far greater measure of autonomy to the Provinces...
4. We shall work for the maintenance and assertion of the right of the people of any Province of the Union, in the face of any actual, attempted or projected violation of the letter or spirit of the Constitution, to remain a part of the Commonwealth under the Crown... *[including]* A weakening of our allegiance to the Crown; the setting aside of the Entrenched Clauses; the denial of the testing power of the Courts; the abolition of the Provincial Council system or the reduction of Provincial powers; the abolition of full protection or of recognition of the equal rights of both official languages.
5. The maintenance of a Western democratic form of government and of Parliamentary institutions; the protection of the basic liberties of the people and the freedom of the individual---
6. The promotion of racial accord among Europeans with unyielding resistance against any attempt at the domination of one group by the other.

Racial harmony between European and non-European is as essential as that between European and European; a progressive rather than a repressive non-European policy...

7. The abandonment of fear as the guiding principle; and the adoption...of courageous policies, offers the only hope in the field of non-European affairs...

We adhere to the principle that the franchise already extended to the non-European should in no way be curtailed or by any means rendered less effectual. The South-African-born non-European should be accorded a right of expression in the organs of Government, commensurable with his degree of civilisation as follows:

1. The full programme is printed in Kruger, op.cit., pp. 101-103.

(a) The present system of limited group representation of Natives to be maintained and an interim period of group representation of Indians on a system similar to that accorded to Natives to be initiated.

(b) Subject always to due safeguards against disproportionate representation of any one section of the non-European population, the long-term policy to be taken in steps over a considerable period of years, is the ultimate placing of those non-Europeans who have passed suitable tests of a high standard, upon a common roll of voters.....

We stand for the recognition of all South-African born people, Coloureds, Bantu and Indians, as members of the greater South African community.

This was not, it is obvious, a giant leap forward in the direction of liberalism, but it was a clearly identifiable step. In the Natal Provincial Council elections in 1954 some Federal Party candidates placed substantial emphasis on the greater liberalism of their Party compared with the conservatism of the United Party. To this observer of many of its campaign meetings it was apparent, however, that its most vociferous supporters were attracted not by the Party's relative liberalism but by its emphasis on loyalty to the Crown, adherence to the Commonwealth, and, above all, by the exciting prospect of withdrawing from the Union if confronted by a dominant Afrikaner republicanism. There was a Kipling-esque element of flag-wagging emotionalism about many of its meetings which might well have disturbed many of its leaders as much as it did those who on more rational grounds favoured its greater liberalism and/or its proposals for a federal system. On the whole, it nevertheless

achieved results that were at least not wholly discouraging. In the seats that it contested it polled a total of some 20,000 votes - enough to give the United Party cause to take it and the views it expressed seriously. But this proved to be its peak performance. It entered no candidates in the 1958 general election and in the 1959 provincial elections in Natal it secured so small a portion of the vote that its demise was inevitable.

So ended, to date, the last South African political party with an orientation specifically directed to the English-speaking section. Only, it seems, in the improbable event of a direct assault on their language rights is another likely to arise.

c. The Liberal Party

The South African Liberal Party was officially formed in July 1953. It was formed out of the Liberal Association which functioned briefly before it was decided to transform it into a political party. This decision was by no means unanimous and not all the members of the Association transferred their membership to the Party. Whether, indeed, the decision was a wise one or not is still an open question. The Association was conceived, to some extent, along lines analogous to the Fabian Society; an organisation for discussion, if possible for research, and for education and propaganda - essentially an interest group of the promotional

type. In a country such as South Africa it might well be argued that an organisation of this type is one of the most urgent needs. It may be said that the Institute of Race Relations fills this need and to some extent it does; but the Institute is not really a propagandising or activating agency, its functions being mainly limited to discussion, research and the dissemination of information. As a political party, on the other hand, the Liberal Party is obliged to simplify its case and to suffer from the distortions of its arguments that parties always inflict on their opponents. More seriously still, perhaps, in contesting elections it is forced to expose its numerical weakness; and as all parties are judged in terms of numerical strength, the Liberal Party, and its arguments and policies with it, are dismissed as negligible. An incidental but real further disadvantage from which it has suffered is that most of its members, including most of its leaders and candidates at elections, have been characterised more by their political idealism than by their political acumen. In consequence, Liberals are all too often dismissed as well-meaning but ^{naive}.

There is another reason for regretting the existence of the Liberal Party as a political party, and that is that liberals tend to be identified with Liberals, and vice versa, and liberalism with the policies of the Liberal Party, and

vice versa. There is, of course, an overlap, but the degree of identity is by no means complete. This leads to a number of practical drawbacks. Since the Liberal Party is often not only lacking in popularity but is positively unpopular, the Government and S.A.B.C. attacks on "liberals", "liberalists" and "liberalism" tend to be the more readily believed. The "Liberals" (of the Liberal Party) are too often thought of as cranks and their association with the Congress movement, which was appreciably infiltrated by Communists (not just of the statutory variety), and their support for boycotts of South African goods, and for South Africa's exclusion from the Commonwealth (at the time South Africa wanted it to be in), all helped reduce the level of scepticism to assertions that liberalism was one of the main "enemies" of the state, the ally, whether consciously or not, of Communism.

Liberalism in South Africa has, one might say "of course", a long and honourable history. It was not always associated with the concept of race equality - it might for example, be directed at winning the freedom of the press, at limiting the autocratic powers of Governors, or at preserving the rights of free speech and petition. But liberalism, in its connotation of racial brotherhood and equality, too, has a long history and can claim many outstanding champions, although not all of them would have

wanted to join the Liberal Party. And still to-day, there are liberals in the broad sense of the term who remain outside the Liberal Party, just as there are members of the Liberal Party who are "liberals" only in the sense of advocating the immediate grant of universal adult suffrage. The origin of the Liberal Movement in its contemporary connotation can, however, be identified with the emergence of Liberal associations in Durban, Johannesburg and Cape Town in 1937 and 1938. They received their stimulus from the resignation of Jan Hofmeyr from the Cabinet over the nomination of Mr. Fourie as a Senator on the ostensible ground required in the constitution, of his "thorough acquaintance" with the "reasonable wants and wishes" of the coloured races, when it was clear that Hertzog was using the nominating procedure merely in order to find Fourie a place in Parliament so that he could have him back in his Cabinet. When Hofmeyr was later expelled from the caucus of the United Party, those associated with the Liberal Movement hoped to persuade him to lead a new Liberal Party. They never succeeded. Hofmeyr insisted that the Liberal cause had to be fought through the United Party; yet even he had some doubts on the tenability of this idea, and he appeared to be wavering in his position when the increasing tension in world affairs made further speculation in that area fruitless. The final split between Hertzog and Smuts over war and neutrality and the recall of Hofmeyr to the Cabinet renewed his commitment to the

United Party that persisted until his death. In consequence, the Liberal Movement in the latter thirties remained similar in nature and function to the Liberal Association that came to be formed in the early fifties.

These facts are worth recalling in that they demonstrate that liberalism, as defined by its philosophy of race relations, was not just a post-World War II phenomenon. On the contrary, it had engaged the minds and hearts - and pens - of such able men as Frankel, Hoernle, Léo Marquard, Cope, Brookes, Fenhalls - to name but a few; and it had a hero and a champion in Hofmeyr, although he remained throughout a member of the United Party.

The change in spirit and attitude, and particularly the quickening nationalism in Asia and Africa, that followed the Second World War, nevertheless imparted to the new Liberal Association a role of especial urgency. The advent of the National Party to power in 1948 and its attempts from 1951 to mould the constitution to its will, again, by reaction, added to the sense of urgency. The culminating factor was the return of the Nationalists to power with an increased majority in 1953. With the forces of the world so clearly pushing towards the fulfilment of racial equality, and with the Nationalist government and its predominantly Afrikaner electorate pushing in the opposite direction of reinforced White supremacy, the bulk of the

Liberal Association felt impelled to enter the electoral arena themselves. Partly they were motivated by their own sense of right, but partly, too, they sought to avert the disastrous collision between the two forces that they believed to be impending. One of its original objects, indeed, was "to demonstrate that here and now there are South Africans who already belong to a common society".¹

The central dilemma of the Liberal Party is its franchise policy. On the one hand, if it were to be a serious contender for votes, it had to frame a franchise policy that would at least have some appeal to White voters. On the other hand, if it was to win the confidence and co-operation of Whites, and if, in particular, it was itself to be a "common society" of Whites and non-Whites, its franchise policy had to be framed in such a way that it did not raise non-White suspicions of White domination in disguised form. At its founding congress in 1953 it leaned, perhaps, more to the White audience than the non-White. It proposed a franchise qualification of either completion of Standard VI (approx. Grade VII) or a minimum income of £250 in cash or kind, together with a system of indirect representation in the Senate for those who failed to meet these qualifications. At the same time it stood for free

1. Quoted in Carter, op.cit., p. 347.

compulsory education for all. Its proposals amounted, therefore, to a graduated advance to a virtually universal franchise. In addition, the Party pledged itself to the enactment of a Bill of Rights and to the repeal of discriminatory legislation. The crushing defeat of a Liberal candidate for the Cape Western by-election for a Natives' representative in 1954 by a well-known Communist together with other evidence of non-White scepticism of its intentions, produced in the same year the statement as the first of its objects, "Equal political rights based on a common franchise." It still, however, retained "interim qualifications" as a transitional step towards universal franchise.

The first general election contested by the Liberal Party was that of 1958. The results were hardly encouraging. Its three candidates received a total of 2,934 votes (an average of 978 votes per candidate) compared with the 22,679 votes (at an average of 7,560 votes per seat) polled by its United Party opponents. In the provincial elections in 1959 it hardly did any better: its four candidates polled only 4,697 votes. Feeling, perhaps, that it had nothing to lose, but influenced on the one hand by the formation of the Progressive Party in late 1959 and on the other by increasing non-White impatience with "gradualism" of any kind, the Party finally moved in 1960 to acceptance of immediate universal franchise as its basic policy. The

shift did not seem to affect its electoral position to any significant degree. The committed remained committed, and the rest remained unconvinced. Its two candidates in 1961 polled a total of 2,461 votes while its United Party opponents polled 13,218 votes. In 1966 it did not enter any candidates at all in the election.

In the election campaigns that it has conducted, the Liberal Party, far from shrinking from presenting the implications of its policies to the voters, has asserted them in as positive a form as possible. In 1958 it used an African speaker on its platforms for the first time; in 1961 non-White canvassers for the first time canvassed White voters. What it has been attempting, however, is not to win seats - at least not in White constituencies. The espousal of a policy of universal suffrage in itself demonstrates the abandonment of such an attempt, if, that is, it ever was seriously made. In fact, the purpose of the Liberal Party remains essentially educative. Elections platforms are used as the most public means of stating its policies, and of demonstrating them. As Alan Paton has written, the Party seeks "to persuade white voters that failure to change their attitudes can lead only to disaster; to uphold the claims of justice and to preach both the folly and the wrongness of race discrimination; to bring African and Indian and Coloured and European Liberals on to the election

platforms, thus giving largely white audiences an opportunity to see that (democratic) values ... are supported by their fellow South Africans of other races...¹

The Party has not, however, been wholly unrepresented in Parliament. Between 1953 and 1960 (when the system was abolished) it has had members representing "Natives" in both the House of Assembly and in the Senate. It might well be, indeed, that this is indicative that it enjoys greater support among non-Whites than among Whites. At its 1961 Congress, it has been observed, Africans formed the majority of the delegates and observers.² It would seem, indeed, that there has been a shift of orientation away from the White electorate and towards the disfranchised non-Whites. Its strategy, too, has moved away from contests in the Parliamentary arena in favour of direct action - e.g. foreign economic boycotts - although as a party it remains firmly committed to non-violent means.

The future of the Liberal Party remains unhopeful. It has been crippled by the Government's use of its banning powers to eliminate one by one many of its most prominent leaders. At the opposite political extreme, the Pan-African Congress split from the older African National Congress largely because it rejected the "assistance" or co-operation

1. Alan Paton, Hope for South Africa (Pall Mall Press, London, 1958), p. 62.

2. Thomas Karis, "South Africa", in Gwendolen M. Carter (ed.) Five African States (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1963), p. 533.

of Whites in the movement for African Liberation in South Africa. Since both African bodies have since been banned, it is impossible to say how successful the PAC has been in spreading its doctrine and in thus further undermining the position of the Liberal Party. But up to the time of its banning and even since then, there has been evidence of considerable PAC support. To-day, perhaps, all the Liberal Party can do is to continue to state its principles and to hope that there is some ground, of whatever colour, left to receive it that is neither too stony nor yet choked with weeds.

d. The Progressive Party

The Progressive Party was thrust into existence as a result of the United Party national congress in July 1959. There had for a long time, indeed in varying degrees since its inception, been tension between the "liberal" and "conservative" wings of the United Party. This tension, however, had markedly increased since 1953. The two parties formed from the ranks of its supporters immediately after the election, were both left of its centre: the Liberal Party at the extreme, and the Federal Party somewhere in the middle of left section of the spectrum. In the following year some seven United Party M.P.s hived off to form the Conservative Party. The range of opinion that remained in the Party continued, however and in spite of these developments, to be almost as wide as before. It would appear

that a struggle to attain dominant influence in the Party then developed between the two wings. Finally, in a strategy reportedly devised by Mr. Douglas Mitchell, the Natal Provincial Leader of the Party, a series of resolutions was put to the 1959 congress that was passed over the objections of the liberal wing, as a result of which eleven (later twelve) M.P.s and four M.P.C.s resigned from the Party. In October it was announced on behalf of the group that a new political party would be formed. Finally in a congress held in Johannesburg in November 1959 the Progressive Party came into being.

One advantage that Progressive Party enjoyed from the beginning was that of an established and able Parliamentary team. This included Dr. Jan Steytler, former leader of the United Party in the Cape and one of its most forceful characters, Mr. Harry Lawrence, a former United Party cabinet minister, described by Die Vaderland as that party's "most capable Parliamentarian and most skilful political strategist,"¹ Dr. Zac de Beer and Mr. R.A.F. Swart, two of the most promising of the United Party's younger M.P.s., and Mrs. Helen Suzman, at present the Progressives' sole remaining M.P. It also enjoyed the substantial advantage of having the financial backing of Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, South Africa's foremost mining magnate.

1. Die Vaderland, September 16, 1959.

At its opening congress, the Progressive Party adopted six principles. The first three are the most important and clearly indicate its purpose. These are:

1. The maintenance and extension of the values of Western Civilisation, the protection of fundamental human rights and the safeguarding of the dignity and worth of the human person irrespective of race, colour or creed.
2. The assurance that no citizen of the Union of South Africa shall be debarred on grounds of race, religion, language or sex from making the contribution to our national life of which he or she may be capable.
3. The recognition that in the Union of South Africa there is one nation which embraces various groups differing in race, religion, language and traditions; that each such group is entitled to the protection of these things and of its right of participation in the government of the nation; and that understanding, tolerance and goodwill between the groups must be fostered.¹

The Progressive Party, in short, stands, like the Liberal Party, opposed to all forms of racial discrimination, and like the Liberal Party, it stands pledged to the repeal of a long line of discriminatory legislation. Yet there is a clear point of distinction between the Progressive and Liberal parties. Where the Liberals talk of a "common society" the Progressives talk of "one nation", and in doing so, moreover, they emphasize the group constituents of the nation. The Liberals look to the emergence of a society in which group characteristics, whether they be

1. D. W. Kruger, op. cit., p. 105.

of religion, race or colour, no longer differentiate one member from another. The Progressives, on the other hand, envisage a "multi-racial" society, insisting that group sentiments are likely to persist and therefore to continue to be important politically. Where the Liberals, therefore, put their faith in a common adherence to the principles of liberal democracy, buttressed only by a Bill of Rights, the Progressives contemplate a continuing tendency for group to seek to dominate group and face the problem of how to avoid such domination by whatever group it may be.

To assist it in this task the Party appointed a distinguished "commission of experts", from both within and without the Party, under the chairmanship of Mr. Donald Molteno, Q.C., and including such members as ex-Chief Justice Centlivres,¹ former Judge Blackwell and Mr. Harry Oppenheimer, and was representative of all the major ethnic groups. The commission was instructed to advise the Party on the construction of a constitution that would embody its principles. It produced its report in two parts, the first dealing with the Franchise and the Senate and a Bill of Rights, the second dealing with proposals for the establishment of a federal in place of the present unitary constitution, the protection of judicial independence, the method of amending the proposed

1. Mr. Centlivres presided over the Appellate Division in all the cases arising out of the "constitutional crisis." The present author was one of the seven academics who served on the commission.

constitution and the basis on which a proposed National Convention might be summoned.

In general the commission sought to reconcile two principles. On the one hand it sought, particularly in the composition and powers of the Senate and in the amending procedure, to provide a system of checks and balances as between the groups to prevent as far as possible the monopolisation of power by any one group; and on the other hand, it sought to prevent the polarisation of politics on racial grounds. In pursuit of its first object it recommended a method for the election of Senators that would, it was hoped, oblige candidates to appeal to voters across racial boundaries, and at the same time proposed important additions to the powers of the Senate, and a method of constitutional amendment that would, in effect, confer a veto power on the majority of voters belonging to any one racial group. In pursuit of the latter, by a majority of its members, it advised against an electoral system for the House of Assembly that would emphasise racial differences, e.g., by use of "reserved" seats, communal representation, or even the "double roll" system. Instead it recommended a single franchise that was slightly more conservative than the Liberal's 1953 franchise proposals: Standard VIII (Grade 9) on its own, or literacy plus an income of £500 p.a., or Standard IV (Grade 5) plus an income "in cash and/or kind" £300 p.a.

The Progressive Party adopted almost all of these proposals but on the question of the franchise accepted the minority report of Dr. de Beer and Mr. Oppenheimer which provided for slightly higher general qualifications and, in addition, a special roll with the minimum requirement of literacy plus an income of £180 p.a. for the purpose of electing representatives to the number of 10 per cent of the Members of Parliament.

Inevitably the Party has been accused both by those to the right of it and by those to the left of it of being hopelessly unrealistic. Those to the right claimed that even those "Natives" who had the proposed qualifications were still "not ready" to exercise the vote. Perhaps, some argued, one could admit those with a university degree, or, according to some slightly more daring, those with a senior high school matriculation, but Standard Four....! And those to the left insisted that with all non-White political movements dedicated to the principle of "one man one vote," the Progressives were offering "too little too late."

The test for the Party came in the 1961 elections. Ex-chief Albert Luthuli, former President of the ANC, urged voters to support the Progressives. This was an encouragement to the Party in that it indicated that Africans did not wholly reject its programme; but what it wanted just as urgently was votes and seats. And here too it met with encouragement

during its election campaign. Its speakers did not disguise the fact that its policies would create in the near future a Black majority in the electorate, but, they argued, the system they proposed would ensure that all groups would continue to enjoy equal rights of participation and of protection, thus enabling the creation of a nation in which discrimination would wither and justice flourish. Altogether, the Party entered 21 candidates, although it was careful not to create three-cornered fights with the United and National parties. It won only one seat; but it had some consolation. In one seat it lost by less than 100 votes, in another by under 200, and in five other seats the margin was less than a thousand. Altogether it polled 66,423 votes and averaged over one-third of the votes polled in the constituencies it contested. To most white South Africans, this performance was adjudged astonishingly successful and was viewed with hope or alarm according to the point of view.

The general election of 1966 was equally crucial for the Party. Was the 1961 result a flash in the pan? Did the Party have staying power? To gain an answer to these questions, the Progressives entered a total of 26 candidates. And out of the election there remained only one flicker of hope, the return of Mrs. Suzman.¹ In terms of over-all strength, however, the Party slumped badly. Altogether it polled only 32,803 votes - less than half the

1. With a majority of 711 votes over her United Party opponent.

number of votes it recorded in 1961. It is true that the times were not propitious. The wave of popular emotion in support of the Smith regime ran counter to the Progressives' attempt to maintain a balanced view on events in Rhodesia; and the wave of revolutions in the rest of Africa reinforced White conservatism in South Africa. But will the times ever be propitious for the development of liberal attitudes (whether of the Liberal or of the Progressive variety)? One thing seems reasonably certain: for as long as instability and turmoil can be made to seem characteristic of African regimes, and/or for as long as the rest of the world can be made to seem intent on imposing a Black regime on South Africa, neither the Liberal Party nor the Progressive Party is likely to have any substantial success in gaining converts to its policies.

C. VOTING BEHAVIOUR

1. The Afrikaners and the National Party

The history of the National Party demonstrates the growing consolidation of the Afrikaans section behind it; and this, in part at least, implies, or certainly did imply until 1961, the separation of the Afrikaners into a distinct people, a priority given to sectional ideas and aspirations over national objectives, or at least an identification of the latter with the former.

The inferences to be drawn from the facts are clear, and may be stated at the outset: (a) the Afrikaner section as a whole did not at first identify itself with the National Party, and (b) that, except for the period 1933-1943, the extent of identification has steadily grown.

No detailed studies of elections down to 1943 have yet been made. The figures for those elections, therefore, can be given only in their "raw" form, i.e. without any allowance being made for uncontested seats. Further to complicate analysis, census returns prior to 1936 give information only on "Languages Spoken" without reference to "Home Language". Since many Afrikaans-speaking people are bilingual, the number given under "Afrikaans" (i.e. Afrikaans only), is much smaller than the total number of Afrikaans-speaking people. On the

other hand, the large number given under "Both" includes those who had English as their home language as well as those who had Afrikaans. The percentage of the total population formed by the Afrikaner section (i.e. those with Afrikaans as home language) cannot, therefore, be accurately determined until 1936.

One means of arriving at a "working" figure is, however, afforded by the tables giving the religions of the white population. As a check on the accuracy of these figures, the percentages of the total given under the Dutch Reformed Churches are compared with the percentages of those giving Afrikaans as their home language for the years for which both sets of figures are available, i.e. 1936-1960:

	% D.R.C.	% Afrikaans
1936	54.3	55.9
1941	53.9	57.3
1951	53.1	56.9
1960	53.7	58.0

On this evidence, there are Afrikaners who are not members of any of the Dutch Reformed Churches, and, one may assume, at least since Union, there always have been. The percentages given for the Dutch Reformed Churches under Religion will be slightly lower, then, than the percentages for Afrikaans as

home language. These figures are as follows:

	% D.R.C.
1911	54.4
1918	56.3
1921	55.2
1926	55.0

From these figures it would seem probable that the percentage of Afrikaners of the total white population during the period 1911-1936 varied around 55-56%.

We can now turn to the election returns for this early period, 1915-1938.

	N.P. Seats		N.P. % of votes cast (contested seats only)
	Total	As % of House	
1915	27	20.8	28.9
1920	43	32.1	35.9
1921	44	32.6	37.8
1924 ⁽¹⁾	63	46.7	34.9
1929	77	52.0	40.7
1933 ⁽²⁾	75	50.0	31.3 ⁽³⁾
1938 ⁽⁴⁾	27	18.0	31.1

- (1) The Nationalist-Labour "Pact" Government formed.
- (2) The election was fought by the National and South African Parties in coalition. They did not, therefore, contest the same seats.
- (3) The small percentage vote cast for the National Party is accounted for by the large number of independent and minor party candidates. These candidates altogether won 39.3 per cent of the popular vote.
- (4) These figures are for the "purified" Nationalists.

In terms of seats won, the steady advance of the National Party at least until 1929 is very apparent, and this generally holds true, as well, for its share of the vote. At the same time, the figures previously given suggest that the proportion of Afrikaners to total population probably remained fairly steady. On this basis, then, it would appear that the Afrikaners vote, at least until Fusion, was turning more and more solidly in favour of the National Party. In 1943 the

trend was resumed, and from 1958 on probably more than 85% of the Afrikaans community has voted for the National Party.¹

More accurate figures can be given for the elections, 1943-1958, although the "estimated votes" (i.e. with allowance for uncontested seats) for 1943 and 1948 should be treated with caution in view of the difficulty of making reliable estimates for those years. The figures for the 1960 referendum are exact, in that there were "contests" in every constituency. No figures are given for the 1961 election because the large number of uncontested seats in that election (approximately one-third) increases unduly the probable margin of error in making estimates for uncontested seats. It is patent, however, that the swing to the National Party increased in that year, and that it continued in 1966.

The trend for the years 1943-1960 is shown in the accompanying graphs. Of only indirect interest in the present context is the disparity clearly shown in these graphs between the seats won by the National Party and the amount of support in the country that it actually enjoyed. Although the interest is only indirect, it may be as well briefly to mention the reasons for this disparity. Part of the answer is to be found in the rural areas. In the Union as a whole during this period

1. Cf. Karis, op.cit., p. 524.

the Afrikaners formed from 84.0% to 81.7% of the rural population, and in the key Provinces of the Cape and the Transvaal, the figures are between 85.3% and 82.0%, and between 87.0% and 86.3% respectively. In these areas, therefore, it is necessary for only slightly more than 60% of the Afrikaans portion of the electorate to vote for the National Party in order to win these seats. The other part of the answer lies in the obverse side to the picture just presented. The English-speaking section has always, at least since Union, been primarily centred in the urban areas; and its vote has tended to be concentrated, therefore, in those seats. In consequence, the United Party vote has been mainly deployed in the wasteful task of building up large majorities in a relatively small number of seats; and in the rural areas it has been too evenly spread to gain seats in all but a very few areas, mainly in the Natal midland and coastal regions and the Eastern Cape.

The major interest of the graphs for present purposes, however, lies in the demonstration they afford of the two points made at the outset of this paper, viz. that in 1943 there was still a substantial number of Afrikaans-speaking people who voted for parties other than the National Party. (One cannot, in this context, however, accurately speak of voting across the 'language barrier', because neither the

old S.A.P. nor its successor, the U.P., was or is an English-speaking party in the sense that the N.P. is an Afrikaner Party. English-speaking people who vote for the N.P., on the other hand, do vote across the 'language barrier'). And secondly, the number of Afrikaans voters not voting for the N.P. has been steadily diminishing, so that an equation is being approached between the percentage of the population who have Afrikaans as their mother tongue and the percentage of the voters who vote for the National Party.

This trend is most apparent perhaps in Natal (graph 10). That graph is also interesting in that it would seem to support the view that at least some English-speaking voters have voted for the National Party, particularly in the 1960 referendum, since the percentage of votes cast for the N.P. exceeded the percentage of Afrikaans-speaking people of the White population. (The decline in the number of seats won by the National Party is the result of delimitation: Natal lost a seat in 1953, a rural seat that had been won by the Afrikaner Party in 1948; and in 1958, a new urban seat was created which, almost inevitably, was won by the United Party).

The virtual monopoly of rural seats enjoyed by the National Party has produced a situation where the Opposition seats are largely confined to the major urban areas. A clear demarcation between Nationalist areas and Opposition areas is

the result. The National Party in consequence tends to dismiss Opposition supporters as unrepresentative of the nation - "island dwellers in the great South African community, blocs of people who seal themselves off hermetically from their fellowmen ..." as Die Transvaler termed them in 1958.¹

The point, however, is more general than that. As Gwendolen Carter has commented: "Increasingly, South African delimitations are separating National and United Party supporters into different constituencies..."² This situation led one Nationalist newspaper to offer the novel suggestion that delimitation commissions in the future might consider deliberately constructing more mixed, presumably marginal, seats. One wonders from which side of the political fence these would be drawn. The increase both in votes and in seats won by the National Party is generally, but not always, associated with a relative increase in the Afrikaner population. This association is most clearly seen in the Cape urban areas (graph 5) and in the Transvaal urban areas (graph 8). It is interesting to note, however, that while there has been a striking increase in the N.P.'s share both of votes and of seats in the Cape urban areas, this increase had been less striking than in the Transvaal urban areas; and that in the

1. Die Transvaler, March 14, 1958.

2. Op. cit., p. 492.

former, the gap between the relative size of the Afrikaner population and the relative size of the N.P. vote remains considerably larger than is the case in the Transvaal urban areas. The line of speculation suggested by this last point is that the much older tradition of intermingling between the two groups in the Cape may have inhibited the development of a sectional nationalism that identifies itself with the National Party.

2. The English-speaking voter

The English-speaking population of South Africa has rarely, since the creation of the Union, acted as a homogeneous political unit. In the early years of the Union, it was, it is true, largely identified with the Unionist Party which had Jameson, of Jameson Raid fame, as its leader. The Unionist Party was mainly centred in the Cape and the Transvaal, and it was closely allied with urban - i.e. commercial and mining - interests.

Since Union the English-speaking section has always formed a minority of the population. Any political party, therefore, that is exclusively identified with them, or that limits its appeal to them, can never expect to gain control of the government. Moreover, the bias of the delimitation system has consistently favoured the rural voter. A purely

or predominantly "Town" party, therefore, was equally unlikely to gain control of the government. Both these factors militated against the Unionist Party. Eventually, it is true, the migration to the towns reached proportions great enough to offset the effects of the system of "loading" and "unloading"; but the migration was predominantly Afrikaner, and its political effect, therefore, was equally unfavourable to the fortunes of the Unionist Party.

In the fluid condition of party politics in the first years of Union, however, the inevitable doom of the Unionist Party was by no means apparent. In 1910 it returned 38 members to the Union Parliament, and in 1915 it increased its representation to 40. But in 1920, its strength dropped to 20 and its eventual decline became more apparent.

One person who appreciated this was General Smuts. The declining fortunes of the South African Party itself, however, forced him to look for an electoral ally. His first hope was the Labour Party, but that party remained adamant in its refusal to join him. If he was to remain in office, therefore, his only alternative lay in an approach to the Unionist Party. Such an approach, however, carried with it a serious risk, that of alienating his Afrikaans support and of giving substance to the charge that he had sold himself to British Imperialism, a charge already laid at his door on account of the government's

decision to participate in the first World War on the side of Britain, the government's handling of the 1914 Rebellion, and Smuts's own prominence in England during the war years.

Nevertheless, Smuts went ahead, although his terms were severe: the dissolution of the Unionist Party itself as a preliminary step to its members joining the South African Party. This duly took place, and in consequence the English-speaking voters lost their separate political identity, although their influence in the South African Party (later the United Party) was increased, except for the 1933-1939 period of Fusion when it suffered a decline.

This increase in the influence of English-speaking persons in the South African and later in the post-1939 United Party was in part the product of the growing alienation of the Afrikaner from that party and his increasing identification with the National Party. The growth of English support and influence and the decline of Afrikaner support thus acted upon and accelerated each other.

On the other hand, the successes of the National Party under Hertzog (in office from 1924-1933) evoked a more militant nationalism among the English; and in 1932, Natal was agitated by demands for a new federal structure guaranteeing the rights of the Provinces, or, failing that (or as a means to it) for

secession from the Union. The 1933 elections, however, saw the Home Rule Party - the expression of this movement - return only two members, and win, altogether, only 12,328 votes.

The coalition and subsequent fusion of the National and South African Parties (1933-1934), however, evoked a further demonstration of English "nationalism" and the Dominion Party was accordingly created in 1934. In the 1938 election this Party gained over 52,000 votes and secured the election of eight of its candidates. One of these was elected in East London, Cape, all of the rest from Natal.

The Hertzog-Smuts split in 1939 altered the situation, however. The Dominion Party survived to fight the 1943 elections as a distinct party, but as a coalition partner of the United Party, and not long afterwards the bulk of its members merged with Smuts's United Party.

Later resurgences of distinctively English-speaking activity were less effective. The "crisis" election of 1953 had brought into being the Torch Commando. It was led by "Sailor" Malan, of Afrikaans descent, but its membership was largely English-speaking. After the election the Torch Commando disbanded, but many of its leading members became involved in the creation of the Federal Party.

Most of the objects of the Federal Party were directed

to the establishment of a federal in place of the present unitary constitution, the protection of democratic rights and the relative liberalisation of non-White policies. But it also stood for the right of any Province to secede in the event of certain eventualities. While these were framed in general terms, they were clearly intended to apply in particular to Natal. The federal Party, therefore, was branded as a secessionist party, and, as such, it failed. Its high-water mark was reached in the 1954 provincial elections in Natal. It did not win a single seat, but it did poll approximately 20,000 votes. Even that, however, fell far short of the old Dominion Party's support.

The latest, the least successful, and perhaps the last attempt by the English-speaking section - or that part of it that lives in Natal - to assert itself politically was the revival of the "Natal Stand", that occurred at the time of the Referendum campaign. Large crowds in rallies in Durban and Pietermaritzburg avowed their intention "to go it alone" if South Africa became a republic. But in the event, the movement was deserted by its former leader, Douglas Mitchell, and collapsed. The Legums (in South Africa: Crisis for the West) comment: "But when the Republic was born, it became all too clear that the 'Natal Stand' is the lamest of all

the country's lost causes."¹

In other ways, however, the English-speaking section plays an important role in South African politics: the English-speaking universities, the English press and the English churches remain the most outspoken and most effective critics of Government policies. The parties that reject discrimination - the Liberal and Progressive Parties - are supported mainly but not exclusively by English-speaking people (including Jews); and the United Party itself has perhaps paid the full price for its early marriage with the Unionist Party, for the seats that it now wins are mostly in areas where English-speaking voters predominate.

In the 1966 general election the Natal results are of particular interest in indicating the trend of opinion among the English-speaking section. For the first time since Union the National Party contested every single seat. In the referendum in 1960 only 23.7 per cent of the voters in Natal voted in favour of a republic, compared with 23.4 per cent of the total Natal white population having Afrikaans as their home language. In 1966 the Party polled 40.3 per cent of the votes cast in Natal, clearly an indication of a continuing - indeed accelerated - trend among English-speaking voters in Natal to vote for the National Party. It is also noteworthy that

1. (Pall Mall Press, London, 1964), p. 99.

five of the Nationalist candidates in Natal are clearly identifiable as English-speaking.

While the voters of Natal moved towards the National Party, they most conspicuously deserted the Progressive Party. With the same number of candidates (seven) in the field, it scored only 7,682 votes in 1966 compared with the 25,437 votes cast for it in 1961. It would seem, therefore, that not only are English-speaking voters voting more readily for the Government party, but that they are doing so at least partly because they are becoming more conservative in their race attitudes. This view is also supported by the Transvaal results where the Progressive Party entered ten candidates - twice the 1961 number - and still polled only 628 more votes than in 1961.

It should finally be pointed out that if 60 percent of the votes cast in the Republic as a whole supported the National Party in 1966, this means that a significant number of English-speaking voters through the country must have voted for that party, especially since a significant number of Afrikaners still voted for the United Party. If this is so,

1

and there can be little doubt that it is¹, at least in terms of party support, the political fence is beginning to move more clearly away from the linguistic boundary; although the great and probably increasing majority of Afrikaans-speaking voters vote for the National Party, and the great majority of English-speaking voters still vote for the United Party and other opposition candidates. The danger now would appear to be that if this trend continues it will be the National Party that embraces both language groups and the United Party that will become the party of the English-speaking section as such. There are probably members of both parties who would not welcome such an eventuality, although for very different reasons.

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1. The only doubt that could arise would be whether there was a large number of abstentions among the English-speaking voters. In view of the fact that there was an 80.6% poll this possibility can probably be dismissed. Nor is there any other evidence to support an hypothesis of large-scale English-speaking withdrawal from the election.

Graphs

Key:

_____ : % Afrikaners of total White population
- - - - - : % seats won by National Party
- . - . - . - : estimated % votes for National Party

N.B. To avoid problems of copyright, these graphs
are for private circulation only.

70

60

50

40

30


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


1936 1943 1946 1948 1951 1953 1958 1960 Year
(C) (E) (C) (E) (C) (E) (E) (C, R)

C = Census ; E = General Election ; R = Referendum.

Population distribution compared with support for National Party (2).
- Urban areas of Union -
1943-1960.



Population distribution compared with support for National Party (3).- Rural areas of Lincoln1943 - 1960

%

70

60

50

40

30

1930

1940

1950

1951

1955

1960

1965

1970



28



50

10

20

30

40

100

100

100


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




Population of the country having 100% literacy strengths (Q)

Total population 1951

100% literacy



Population Distribution compared with Party Strengths (10).Natal - All Areas.1943 - 1960.

%

25


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
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10

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Population Distribution compared with Party Strengths. (II).

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